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WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED, RANDOMLY 




It is sadly true that there are people in this country who are sentenced to 
prison, and even death, for crimes they did not commit. Some have been 
exonerated and released, largely as the result of innocence projects that have 
helped prisoners assemble DNA evidence that shows they were not the 
perpetrators. 1 Some have been exonerated years after they died in prison. Many 
others are no doubt never exonerated.2 For a wrongfully convicted person, 
exoneration is the end of one road but only the beginning of another. 
Unbelievably, exonerees starting out on the road back to society find that they get 
little to no help from the justice system. Offenders on parole and convicts who 
complete their sentences may receive more services than released persons who 
committed no crime at all.3 This Article is based on the premise that states must 
pay compensation to innocent persons who have suffered wrongful 
imprisonment. The Article explains why exoneration is not enough. It then 
discusses theoretical justifications that support the payment of compensation and 
refutes objections to making such payments. Finally, it lays out concrete ways 
in which states may budget for wrongful-conviction compensation statutes. 
Although monetary compensation can hardly make up for years of wrongful 
imprisonment, providing compensation is the least a state can do after an 
• Associate Professor and Director of Legal Writing and Research, Golden Gate University 
School of Law. J.D., 1988, University of Utah College of Law. 
I. For example, Gary Dotson's 1979 conviction for rape was vacated and the charges 
dismissed on August 14, 1989. Samuel R. Gross et ai., Exonerations in the United States i989 
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOWGY 523, 523 (2005). This was the "first exoneration 
by DNA evidence ... [to take] place in the United States." Lauren C. Boucher, Comment, 
Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation for the Erroneously Convicted and 
Wrongfully incarcerated, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 1069, 1069 (2007). One hundred ninety-eight post-
conviction exonerations based on DNA evidence occurred between 1989 and 2007. Abigail 
Penzell, Apology in the Context of Wrongful ConViction: Why the System Should Say it's Sorry, 
9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 145, 145 (2007) (citing About Us: Mission Statement, THE 
INNOCENCEPROJECT,http://www.innocenceproject.orgiaboutlMission-Statement.php(lastvisited 
Feb. 12,2011)). 
2. Unknown numbers of prisoners whose innocence was never established have died in 
prison. Looking at exonerations begirming in 1989, "[i]n four cases, states posthumously 
acknowledged the innocence of defendants who had already died in prison: Frank Lee Smith, 
exonerated in Florida in 2000; Louis Greco and Henry Tameleo, exonerated in Massachusetts in 
2002; and John Jeffers, exonerated in Indiana in 2002." Gross et ai., supra note I, at 524. 
3. Heather Weigand, Rebuilding a Life: The Wrongfolly Convicted and Exonerated, 18 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 427, 429 (2009). 
504 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:503 
innocent person is exonerated. 
Part I of this Article explains wrongful conviction tenninology. Part II 
explains how the very same reasons that make it easy for innocent people to be 
convicted also make it difficult for them to be exonerated. Part m explains why 
governments must compensate the wrongfully incarcerated when they win their 
freedom. It discusses the reasons for and against government compensation, 
rejecting the argument that imprisoning and even executing innocent persons is 
a harsh but necessary cost of doing business. Part N deals with the hard 
question of how to pay for wrongful-conviction compensation statutes. To 
ensure that wrongfully imprisoned persons actually obtain compensation, the 
Article makes concrete suggestions for funding compensation statutes. 
Wrongfully convicted persons who win their freedom deserve compensation 
statutes, and states can afford them. 
I. TERMINOLOGY 
Innocent people convicted and sentenced to prison are described as the 
"wrongly convicted,"4 the "wrongfully convicted,"5 the "erroneously convicted,,,6 
the "unjustly convicted,,,7 and the "unjustly imprisoned,,,g among other terms.9 
The prison sentence is also variably described as "wrongful imprisonment,,,IO 
"wrongful conviction,"11 or "unjust conviction.,,12 I make the stylistic choice of 
4. Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the 
Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REv. 665 (2002). 
5. John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record-Lessons 
from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRlCALLEGAL STUD. 477 (2008); Shawn Armbrust, Note, 
When Money Isn't Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 157 (2004). 
6. Boucher, supra note I; Christine L. Zaremski, Comment, The Compensation of 
Erroneously Convicted Individuals in Pennsylvania, 43 DUQ. L. REv. 429 (2005). 
7. Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate 
Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 703 
(2004) [hereinafter Bernhard, Justice Still Fails]; Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: 
Indemnificationfor Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73 (1999) [hereinafter 
Bernhard, When Justice Fails]; Erin Ann O'Hara, Victims and Prision [sic} Release: A Modest 
Proposal, 19 FED. SENT'G REp. 130, 133 (2006) (using the term "innocent convicts"). 
8. Shelley Fite, Compensation for the Unjustly Imprisoned: A Model for Reform in 
Wisconsin, 2005 WIS. L. REv. 1181. 
9. Charles I. Lugosi, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, Habeas Corpus and Justice, 
12 GEO. MAsON U. C.R. L.J. 233 (2002); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial 
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125 (2004). 
10. Jonathan L. Entin, Being the Government Means (Almost) Never Having to Say You're 
Sorry: The Sam Sheppard Case and the Meaning of Wrongful Imprisonment, 38 AKRON L. REv. 
139 (2005). 
11. Penzell, supra note I; see also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple 
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIs.L. REv. 291, 291; Brandon L. Garrett, 
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the Anglo-Saxon "wrong/wrongful/wrongfully" over the Latinate 
"error/erroneous/erroneously" and the philosophical choice of 
"wrongful/wrongfully" over "unjust/unjustly." "Wrongfully" describes how the 
convicting was done, whereas "unjustly" focuses on the result of the conviction. 
The injustice flows from the wrongfulness of the conviction. 13 Those who win 
their freedom are commonly called "exonerees." 
n. BACKGROUND: WHY IT Is EASY TO BE CONVICTED AND DIFFICULT 
TO BE EXONERATED 
From mythology to the Bible to Shakespeare to children's tales, popular 
culture is replete with stories in which no one believes a speaker's claim to be 
telling the truth. 14 Modern American criminal law has its share of such stories. 
Fifty years ago a murder took place that resulted in one of the best known stories: 
the tale of "The Fugitive." Told and retold on television and in the movies, the 
story focuses on Sam Sheppard, who was wrongfully accused of murdering his 
wife, convicted, and imprisoned for twelve years before being found not guilty. 15 
More recent examples include the teens accused of raping the "Central Park 
Jogger"16 and members of the Duke University lacrosse team accused of raping 
Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REv. 35. 
12. Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 7, at 715; Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra 
note 7, at 73. 
13. It is noteworthy that commentators do not use the word "mistakenly" to describe the 
convicting of innocent persons. The unspoken assumption seems to be that a mistake can be 
innocent, but a decision reached wrongfully is more blameworthy. 
14. E.g., Greek mythological figures Laocoon (he warned the Trojans not to accept the 
Greeks' gift of the Trojan Horse, but no one listened to him) and Cassandra (she could prophesy 
the future, but it was fated that no one believe her); Biblical figure Susanna (the elders who tried 
to seduce her knew no one would take her word over theirs); Shakespeare's Othello (he refused to 
believe that Desdemona was faithful to him); the Little Red Hen (she warned the barnyard animals 
that she would not share her homemade bread if they did not help plant, harvest, and grind the 
wheat-they did not; she did not). 
15. See Entin,supranote 10, at 139-41. Entin begins this article by reviewing a book written 
by the Sheppard prosecutor about the retrial of the Sheppard case twenty-five years after the 
original wrongful conviction. In Entin's review, he highlights all the ways that the Sheppard 
decision was and remains troubling. He uses that starting point as a springboard to discuss new 
approaches to wrongful imprisonment. 
16. A young female jogger was attacked, beaten, assaulted and left for dead in Central Park 
in April 1989, presumably by a group of teenage boys "wilding" (participating in a violent spree) 
in the park. Five teens were convicted ofthe rape and other attacks that occurred in the park that 
night. In December 2002, as a result of a confession by the real attacker, the boys' convictions were 
set aside. Lynnell Hancock, The Press and the Central Park Jogger, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. 
1, 1-2, Jan. 1,2003, available at http://wwwAefren.com/resourcesffhe+Press+and+the+Central+ 
Park+Jogger.pdf. 
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a woman hired to dance at a party. 17 What makes us believe in a person's guilt 
when that person is not guilty? 
A. Easy to Be Convicted 
Innocent defendants are wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for a variety 
of reasons generally traceable to facets of the criminal justice system. These 
include "fallible eyewitness identification evidence and flawed eyewitness 
identification procedures, false confessions, jailhouse snitch testimony, police 
and prosecutorial misconduct, forensic science error or fraud, and inadequate 
defense counsel.,,18 Mistaken eyewitness testimonyl9 may result in a wrongful 
accusation. Crime lab erro~o or ineffective assistance of counsel21 may tum the 
wrongful accusation into a wrongful conviction. Even though innocent, an 
accused person may confess.22 
Moreover, incentives within the prosecutorial system may influence 
prosecutors to obtain convictions.23 Individually, prosecutors with high 
conviction rates are more likely to advance on the job24 and so may overzealously 
pursue easy targets. Institutionally, district attorneys who show high conviction 
rates may be able to gamer more resources than those who seem to be less 
successful. 25 
B. Difficult to Be Exonerated 
The same circumstances that allow wrongful convictions, and the same 
incentives that promote them, make it as hard to be exonerated as it is easy to be 
convicted. For example, prosecutors may oppose post-conviction DNA testing 
sought by a convicted person.26 Prosecutors may also oppose post-conviction 
17. "Duke University and its men's lacrosse team came under national scrutiny after a 
Durham woman alleged she was assaulted at a March 2006 team party off-campus. On April 11, 
2007, the North Carolina Attorney General's Office dropped all charges against three indicted team 
members, saying they are innocent .... " News & Communications, DUKE UNlv., http://www. 
dukenews.duke.edulmmedialfeatures/lacrosse_incidentl (last visited Feb. 13,2011). 
18. Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 292. 
19. Boucher, supra note 1, at 1074; Lopez, supra note 4, at 675. 
20. Boucher, supra note 1, at 1078; Lopez, supra note 4, at 677 (identifying eyewitness error 
and creating a mega-category of "police, prosecutor, and scientific (mis )conduct"); see also Garrett, 
supra note 11, at 95 n.302, 98 n.311, 99 n.312. 
21. Boucher, supra note 1, at 1080. 
22. Liliana Segura, Why Would Someone Confess to a Crime He Did Not Do?, CHI. SUN-
TIMEs, Oct. 7, 2007, at B 1. 
23. Medwed, supra note 9, at 134-37. For further discussion, see Findley & Scott, supra note 
11, at 374. For discussion in terms of fair trial rights, see Garrett, supra note 11, at 69-110. 
24. Medwed, supra note 9, at 135. 
25. Id. at 134-37. 
26. Id. at 127 n.lO. Charles Lugosi also describes the case of Godschalk v. Montgomery 
County District Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366 (E.D. Pa. 2001), in which defendant 
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evidentiary hearings sought by the defense to present new evidence such as 
confessions from actual perpetrators. 27 Even after a wrongfully convicted person 
is released, prosecutors strive to uphold convictions, often in spite of evidence 
that shows a defendant is innocent. 
Various aspects of the institutional culture of prosecutors , offices contribute 
to the drive to uphold convictions.28 Professionally, once a conviction has been 
attained, "both the individual prosecutor and the office may become vested in 
maintaining the integrity of the conviction.,,29 Psychologically, neither 
individuals nor organizations want to admit mistakes. 30 Prosecutors, though, may 
develop some sort of personal stake in the outcome.3l Even prosecutors who 
realize that innocent people might sometimes be convicted may have an "'ends 
justifies the means' outlook" that keeps them from "acknowledging the 
worthiness of a post-conviction innocence claim.'>32 
Further, prosecutors view post-conviction innocence claims skeptically 
because there are so many of them.33 In addition to the professional and 
psychological motivations, political incentives may influence prosecutors to 
Godschalk was fmally able to win post-conviction DNA testing. Even though the test results 
exonerated Godschalk, the district attorney claimed the test results were flawed instead of releasing 
Godschalk. When further DNA testing still exonerated Godschalk, the district attorney reluctantly 
recommended to the court of common pleas that he be released. The district attorney still, however, 
refused to believe that Godschalk was innocent. Lugosi, supra note 9, at 235 n.1O (citing Sara 
Rimer, Convict's DNA Sways Labs, Not a Determined Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at 
AI4). 
27. Medwed, supra note 9, at 128. 
28. Id. at 132. The Sheppard case presents a prime example. Sam Sheppard was convicted 
of second degree murder of his wife in 1954 and was sentenced to life in prison. Entin, supra note 
10, at 139. Twelve years later, in 1966, the Supreme Court granted habeas corpus review and set 
aside the conviction after holding that pretrial publicity had tainted the original trial. Id. Later that 
year, Sheppard was acquitted in a retrial. Id. He died in 1970, and in 1995, his estate sought a 
declaration of innocence against the state so that the estate could seek compensation for Sheppard's 
wrongful imprisonment. Id. at 139-40. In the civil trial to establish innocence, the jury ruled 
against the estate even though Sheppard's conviction had been set aside and he had been acquitted. 
Id. at 140. The prosecutor in the civil trial, William Mason, set out to prove that Sam Sheppard was 
guilty in spite of the evidence that led to acquittal in his retrial. Entin explains that Mason, in his 
2003 book about the civil trial, "sought to vindicate the honor and reputation of his office and of 
the other law enforcement agencies that had handled the Sheppard case from the beginning." Id. 
at 149. 
29. Medwed, supra note 9, at 136. 
30. Id. at 138. 
31. This seems to have been the case with the prosecutor in the 1995 civil trial at which Sam 
Sheppard's son sought to have Sam Sheppard declared innocent. See Entin, supra note 10, at 139. 
32. Medwed, supra note 9, at 147. 
33. Id. at 148. Under the '''needle in a haystack' view of innocence claims, efficiency 
considerations militate against prosecutors thoroughly reviewing all post-conviction motions." Id. 
at 149. 
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strive to uphold convictions in post-conviction innocence cases, just as these 
same incentives may have led them to prosecute the cases in the first place.34 
First, prosecutors who need to win elections may emphasize a tough-on-crime 
stance.35 Once in office, they need a record of successful convictions to 
substantiate such claims. Second, and ironically, state legislation to compensate 
wrongly convicted individuals may actually motivate prosecutors to resist post-
conviction innocence claims36 because prosecutors may fear that they or their 
departments will end up paying for these claims. 
Statistical studies support the observation that it is difficult to. obtain an 
exoneration. In a study of exonerations in the United States between 1989 and 
2003, Gross and colleagues found 340 documented exonerations.37 This may 
sound like a large number; it is not. According to the authors, 
We can't come close to estimating the number of false convictions that 
occur in the United States, but the accumulating mass of exonerations 
gives us a glimpse of what we're missing .... Almost all the individual 
exonerations that we know about are clustered in two crimes, rape and 
murder. They are surrounded by widening circles of categories of cases 
with false convictions that have not been detected: rape convictions that 
have not been reexamined with DNA evidence; robberies, for which 
DNA identification is useless; murder cases that are ignored because the 
defendants were not sentenced to death; assault and drug convictions 
that are forgotten entirely. Any plausible guess at the total number of 
miscarriages of justice in America in the last fifteen years must be in the 
thousands, perhaps tens of thousands. 38 
Exonerations can be said to demonstrate a failure of our justice system.39 
34. See id at 149. This is not always the case. For example, Nancy E. Ryan, trial division 
chief in the Manhattan district attorney's office, led the reinvestigation of the Central Park Jogger 
case. The report that she authored in 2002, concluding that the five young men in prison for the 
attack had been wrongfully convicted, generated controversy and criticism. "The report, which 
ruled that Matias Reyes was the lone attacker, was criticized by the police and by some in Ms. 
Ryan's office." John Eligon, Turning Off the Phone After 20 Years on Call, CITY ROOM BLOG-
NYTlMES.COM (Mar. 12,201,07:38 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytirnes.coml2010/03112/turning-
otf-the-phone-after-20-years-on-calV. 
35. Medwed, supra note 9, at 127, 154. 
36. Id. at 154. 
37. Gross et aI., supra note I, at 524. Gross points out that his team looked only at 
exonerations that resulted from case-by-case investigations into the particular circumstances of 
exonerated persons. Id at 523-24. Their study did not include mass exonerations or people 
wrongly convicted of crimes such as misdemeanor assault or routine felonies. Id. at 533-35. 
38. Id at 551; see also Lopez, supra note 4, at 671 (noting that "the extent of factually 
incorrect convictions in our system must be much greater than anyone wants to believe"). 
39. See Lopez, supra note 4, at 674. But see Justice Scalia's concurrence in Kansas v. Marsh, 
548 U.S. 163 (2006), a case analyzing the constitutionality of a state statute that required the death 
penalty if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that certain conditions existed. The defense 
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Recently, there does seem to be a trend toward more exonerations,40 yet the 
number of exonerations still remains relatively low. When, against the odds, a 
wrongfully convicted person is exonerated, the last thing he should have to 
contend with is a battle to obtain meaningful compensation. This is a further 
punishment that adds to the existing failures of our justice system. 
ill. GOVERNMENTS MUST COMPENSATE THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 
A. Exoneration Is Not Enough 
A wrongfully convicted and incarcerated person pins his hopes on being 
exonerated. But exoneration is not enough. Exonerating a convicted person does 
not mean that he or she is restored to the status quo ante. Convicted persons 
whose innocence is established may be able to walk out of prison, but it is not so 
easy to walk back into society. More often than not, they have been harmed in 
countless ways. They may have lost years of their lives, their families, the 
opportunity to go to school, or the chance to gain or keep employment. 
In our rapidly changing world, employment skills exonerees possessed upon 
entering prison may be out of date by the time of their release. They probably 
face discrimination in future employment despite their exoneration. They have 
probably lost any savings they once had. They have probably lost confidence in 
their ability to direct and manage their lives. They may have gained a host of 
physical and psychological problems due to prison conditions; in fact, they may 
even have lower life expectancies as a result of their incarceration. Further, they 
have arguably lost their status and respectability in the eyes of society. 
Yet upon being set free from prison, at the time when they are the most 
helpless, exonerated prisoners are released into the world with virtually nothing 
in hand. Exonerees may receive such token assistance as fifty dollars41 or "ten 
dollars and a denim jacket.,,42 Beyond so-called "gate money,,,43 some states 
had contended that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment. The majority rejected the argument. 
Id. at 172. The dissent argued that the Eighth Amendment's application to a death penalty statute 
after 1989 should be assessed in light of the "repeated exonerations of convicts under death 
sentences, in numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests." Id. at 208 (Souter, 
J., dissenting). In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia found fault with statistical studies 
referred to by the dissent. He said that the exonerations included in the statistics were not limited 
to cases of factual innocence. Further, he opined that it "it is utterly impossible to regard 
'exoneration' -however casually defined-as a failure of the capital justice system, rather than as 
a vindication of its effectiveness." Id. at 194 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
40. See Gross et aI., supra note I, at 523,527-28. 
41. Armbrust, supra note 5, at 158. 
42. Lopez, supra note 4, at 669. 
43. The Arizona "gate money" program is typical: discharged prisoners receive up to fifty 
dollars that they have accumulated through deductions from their wages in a prison work program 
or through gifts from families and friends. Prisoners who have not worked will be "gifted" fifty 
dollars. Inmates also receive a set of clothes and possibly a bus or train ticket "to the closest stop 
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provide no help at all to exonerees.44 In all states, exonerees must enter the legal 
system again if they wish to gain anything beyond token assistance. It is a 
difficult fight that exonerees lose more often than not. Even in states that do 
provide compensation through statute, the trigger for compensation is still for the 
exoneree to file a lawsuit against the state.45 Although exonerees in states with 
compensation statutes may seem to be better positioned to receive compensation, 
applying for compensation under these statutes is a difficult and expensive 
undertaking that may still leave exonerees empty-handed. 
1. Three Avenues o/Legal Redress Offer Little Hope to Exonerees.-Four 
avenues oflegal redress exist, but all four are not available in all states. In states 
without compensation statutes, only three avenues may be available. First, an 
exoneree may try to get the state legislature to pass a private bill awarding 
compensation in his or her particular case. Second, an exoneree may be able to 
bring a federal civil rights lawsuit against the government. Third, the exoneree 
may be able to bring a state tort lawsuit against prosecutors, police, or defense 
lawyers. Very few exonerees succeed under these approaches. 
a. Private bills.-The first avenue-the private bill-requires that "a 
wrongly convicted person must lobby his state legislature to pass a private bill 
that dispenses money from the state treasury directly to the lobbying individual 
as a remedy for the injustice of being wrongly convicted.'>46 Lobbying the state 
legislature means finding a state legislator who will sponsor the bill and enlist 
support for it "in both houses so that the bill will pass when it comes up for a 
vote. This can be a long and arduous process ... ."47 
Assuming a private bill passes, some awards are significant;48 some are not. 
In 0 'Neil v. State, defendant Leonard O'Neil was convicted and sentenced to a 
term often to twenty-five years for armed robbery.49 When the actual perpetrator 
confessed, O'Neil had already served three and a half years of his wrongful 
sentence. He sued for compensation, but the court of claims dismissed the suit 
outside state lines." KATE 1. WILSON, CTR. FOR PUB. POUCY RESEARCH, STATE POUCIES AND 
PROCEDURES REGARDING "GATE MONEY" 1-2 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ 
adultJesearch _branch/research _documents/gate_money _ oct_ 2007.pdf. 
44. States without wrongful imprisonment compensation statutes are Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. State Compensation, LIFE AFTER 
EXONERATION PROGRAM, http://www.exonerated.org/contentlindex.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=52&itemid=55 (last visited Feb. 13,2011). 
45. See Boucher, supra note I, at 1083, 1099. 
46. Lopez, supra note 4, at 698. 
47. Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remediesfor the Wrongly Convicted: 
What Works, What Doesn't and Why, 18 B.U.PUB. INT. LJ. 403, 408 (2009)(givinga full account 
of the procedure and discussing some of the awards made in various states via this route). 
48. Id. (discussing Georgia exoneree Clarence Harrison and Alabama exoneree Freddie Lee 
Gaines, who were each awarded $1 million). 
49. O'Neil v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
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for failure to state a claim. At this point, the Ohio General Assembly enacted 
special legislation authorizing him to file a claim for "loss of education and 
employment and general damages ... from the erroneous imprisonment. ,,50 It 
would seem that O'Neil could now be compensated, and he was; the court of 
claims awarded him $6,967. O'Neil appealed this paltry amount. In reversing 
the judgment, the Ohio Supreme Court said that when a person is wrongfully 
convicted, 
the legislature and legal system have a responsibility to admit the 
mistake and diligently attempt to make the person as whole as is possible 
where the person has been deprived of his freedom and forced to live 
with criminals. Indeed the legal system is capable of creating few errors 
that have a greater impact upon an individual than to incarcerate him 
when he has committed no crime.SI 
Viewed in that context, "[the court's] award of $6,967 for O'Neil's three-and-
one-half years of erroneous imprisonment is grossly inadequate, is against the 
manifest weight of the evidence, and shocks the conscience."s2 Although the 
Ohio Court of Appeals gave the court of claims the opportunity to rethink its 
shockingly low award in this case, in general, few private bills ever get passed. 53 
Even when one does pass, it may not go very far toward curing the harm. 
b. Federal civil rights lawsuits under § 1983.-The second possible avenue 
of redress is to bring a federal civil rights lawsuit against the municipality and the 
police. Such a suit is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.54 Section 1983 offers the 
plaintiff a chance to overcome the immunity of state actors. The theory is that 
the municipality or police deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right while 
"acting under color of state law."ss The deprivation of a constitutional right 
removes the barrier of government immunity, allowing the plaintiff to sue units 
of government-such as municipalities and police departments-that are 
normally immune from suit. Section 1983 is the vehicle for "interpos[ing] the 
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 1013. 
52. Id. 
53. Lopez, supra note 4, at 699 ("Unfortunately, legislative compensation remains a longshot 
for most wrongly convicted individuals .... "). 
54. Section 1983 provides that 
[ e ]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
55. See Lopez, supra note 4, at 690-98. 
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federal rightS.,,56 
Before invoking these protections by filing a § 1983 lawsuit, the plaintiff 
must satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2513, the Unjust Conviction and 
Imprisonment Act. This is the federal government's wrongful conviction 
statute,57 and it contains two basic categories of requirements. First, subsection 
(a)(I) requires the plaintiff to use the court record or a court certificate to show 
that: the conviction was set aside or reversed; he was found not guilty in a new 
trial; or he was pardoned on the ground of innocence. 58 Next, under subsection 
(a)(2), the plaintiff must not have committed any of the acts with which he was 
charged, and his own misconduct must not have brought about the prosecution. 59 
Once the requirements of28 U.S.C. § 2513 are satisfied, the exoneree may 
continue his quest under § 1983. Since § 1983 claims center on problems in the 
criminal justice system that may lead to a deprivation of civil rights, § 1983 
seems the ideal path for exonerees to redress civil rights violations that may have 
occurred in their state cases. Focusing narrowly on what plaintiffs must do to 
initiate § 1983 lawsuits suggests that these suits will be very difficult for many 
plaintiffs to bring. Often, a potential § 1983 plaintiff may not be able to satisfy 
the threshold requirements. 
Brandon Garrett, who has represented exonerees in multiple wrongful 
conviction cases,60 points out that a federal wrongful conviction suit may only be 
brought if the exoneree can show that his case terminated with "[v ]acatur of the 
conviction" and that the cause of the wrongful conviction was official 
misconduct.61 The vacatur requirement that "a plaintiff can file a federal case 
challenging unconstitutional conduct resulting in a conviction only after that 
56. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
57. The Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act was passed in 1938. Although it may seem 
that the federal government was aware of wrongful conviction issues rather early, the first attempt 
at wrongful conviction compensation actually dates from a bill introduced in the Senate in 1912. 
S. Doc. No. 974, 62ND CONGo 3D SESS. (1912). 
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(I) (2006) provides that 
[a]ny person suing under section 1495 of this title must allege and prove that: (I) His 
conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the 
offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing he was found not guilty 
of such offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or 
reversing such conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of 
innocence and unjust conviction .... 
"Section 1495" refers to 28 U.S.C. § I 495-damages for unjust conviction and imprisonment-the 
text of which is, "The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render 
judgment upon any claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against the 
United States and imprisoned." 
59. Id. § 2513(a)(2). These are basically the same requirements for bringing a claim under 
state compensation statutes. 
60. See generally Garrett, supra note II. For reference to cases Garrett handled, see id. at 
43 n.30. 
61. Id. at 53-54. 
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conviction is either vacated or pardoned,,62 affects potential § 1983 plaintiffs in 
one of two ways. First, a wrongfully incarcerated prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 
lawsuit while he pursues a state remedy. Instead, he must wait until his state 
causes of action have concluded. This adds years to the time he spends seeking 
redress. Second, and much more damaging, the wrongfully incarcerated prisoner 
who is not able to bring a state suit has no other recourse. Ifhe cannot succeed 
in bringing and winning a state wrongful conviction claim, the state court will not 
set aside the conviction, and the door to a federal civil rights lawsuit will remain 
shut. 
Assuming, however, that the § 1983 plaintiff can establish vacatur, he must 
next show that his injury resulted from official misconduct on the part of police 
or prosecutors.63 Official misconduct may result from official acts, such as 
suppression of exculpatory evidence, suggestive eyewitness identification 
procedures, coerced confessions, or fabrication of evidence.64 Misconduct may 
be at the root of such civil rights causes of action as malicious prosecution and 
retaliatory prosecution.65 Whatever the source, it may be difficult to establish 
that misconduct occurred. For example, police behavior can be justified under 
a probable cause standard. According to Michael Avery, "probable cause[] is a 
low standard, ordinarily not difficult for law enforcement to meet. ,,66 The 
difficulties in establishing vacatur and official misconduct, from the narrow point 
of view of the wrongfully incarcerated individual, suggest that a § 1983 remedy 
may be remote. 
A broader focus, however, indicates a greater significance for § 1983 
lawsuits; these suits are important more as vehicles for exposing and addressing 
systemic deficiencies that led to the wrongful conviction rather than as means of 
redressing injuries to particular exonerees caused by the wrongful conviction. 
According to Garrett, although the two threshold requirements of vacatur and 
official misconduct result in the bringing of fewer wrongful conviction suits than 
"run-of-the-mill civil rights actions, the lawsuits that can be maintained involve 
the most egregious miscarriages of justice in which a conviction was vacated. 
Thus, through that filter, the cases brought may disproportionately involve 
misconduct implicating systemic failures. ,,67 In discussing criminal justice 
reforms being both considered and adopted, Garrett seems to be saying that § 
1983 suits are useful in a societal sense because they bring attention to the 
problems in criminal procedure that set defendants up for wrongful convictions.68 
The usual result of a criminal appeal is for the court to respond in favor of 
62. Id.; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.s. 477, 486-87 (1994). 
63. See Garrett, supra note 11, at 54. 
64. !d. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Brady will be discussed further in 
the rest of this section. 
65. Michael Avery, Obstacles to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongfol Conviction: An 
Overview, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 439, 439 (2009). 
66. Id. at 442. 
67. Garrett, supra note 11, at 54. 
68. See id. at 99-102. 
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the criminal justice system rather than in favor of a criminal defendant, who may 
have been the victim of a suggestive lineup or coerced into confessing.69 For 
example, in Arizona v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court held that potentially 
exculpatory evidence could be destroyed if it was not destroyed in bad faith.70 
But critics of the courts' tendency to favor law enforcement seem less concerned 
with the § 1983 plaintiffs-the exonerees-than with what § 1983 suits may 
accomplish. Civil suits under § 1983 generally focus on such "systemic 
deficiencies" as municipalities' failures to train or supervise police, for 
example.71 Bringing attention to system-wide problems should lead to reform; 
indeed, "[t]he advance deterrent effect of such systemic claims will place the 
focus on what institutions can do to prevent wrongful convictions."n 
Commentators point out a connection between the growing numbers of § 1983 
lawsuits and changes in police techniques that seem to signal institutional 
reform.73 
Certainly some exonerees do win § 1983 lawsuits/4 and exonerees should 
continue to bring § 1983 suits. But they should be aware that their overall chance 
of recovery is slight. 
c. Common law tort suits . -The third avenue of redress is common law tort 
suits. These may be brought in state court or in federal court, depending on the 
specific cause of action. Such suits are also difficult to win. A plaintiff may 
bring a state court tort suit against police or prosecutors based on malicious 
prosecution, but it is generally difficult to prove malice.75 Relying on Brady 
requirements designed to guarantee a fair trial, a plaintiff may make a Brady due 
process claim alleging that the prosecutor's failure to disclose material evidence 
prejudiced the plaintiffs ability to mount an effective defense.76 The difficulty 
here, according to Michael Avery, is that 
[t]he Supreme Court has never resolved whether a criminal defendant's 
due process right to obtain exculpatory evidence in the hands of the 
state, protected by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, is bottomed on 
substantive or procedural due process. As a consequence, the lower 
69. See id. at 58-62. 
70. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988). This seems to be an example of 
moral hazard, discussed infra Part I1I.C.3. 
71. Garrett, supra note II, at 106-07. 
72. ld. at 107. 
73. See, e.g., id. at 45-46. 
74. E.g., Piercey. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (lOth Cir. 2004); Newsomev. McCabe, 319 F.3d 
301 (7th Cir. 2003); Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988) (suppressing exculpatory 
evidence); People v. leGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. 2007) (denying defense request to call an 
expert on causes of mistaken identification). 
75. Garrett, supra note II, at 50-5 I. 
76. Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 36-37 (Mo. 2006). For a very clear explanation of 
how Brady violations may be established and used as the basis for a civil rights lawsuit, see 
Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 7, at 726-28. 
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federal courts are in disagreement on the issue.77 
Predicting outcomes of these cases is difficult. 
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A plaintiff may also bring a tort suit against his own defense attorney for 
ineffective assistance of counse1.78 However, plaintiffs have lostthese suits even 
when their defense counsel slept through the trial,79 presented no evidence during 
the sentencing phase of the trial,80 or was intoxicated during the trial.8l 
Finally, plaintiffs may bring common law tort suits against the United States 
in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).82 The FTCA 
"evinces a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to certain categories of 
torts committed by federal employees in the scope of their employment. ,,83 These 
"certain categories" are all negligence-based causes ofaction because the Federal 
Tort Claims Act specifically excludes the intentional torts of "assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious process, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, [and] interference with contract rights. ,,84 The 
FTCA provides that the United States may only be found liable "under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred.,,85 This means that even though the plaintiff is suing the federal 
government in federal court, the law governing the cause of action will be that 
of the state "in which the allegedly tortious acts or omissions occurred.,,86 This 
law-of-the-state requirement is how the federal government establishes 
jurisdiction over the cause of action. A federal court will not have jurisdiction 
to hear an FTCA case unless a state court would have had jurisdiction if the 
tortfeasor had been a private actor. Claims under the FTCA can only be brought 
77. Avery, supra note 65, at 446 (internal citation omitted). 
78. Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 7, at 736-37. 
79. United States v. Petersen, 777 F.2d 482,484 (9th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff was unable 
to establish ineffectiveness of counsel because defense counsel had not slept through "a substantial 
portion ofthe trial." ld. By comparison, in Burdine v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's conclusion that "sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel" when 
defense counsel "repeatedly dozed or slept as the State questioned witnesses" during Burdine's 
murder trial. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336,339 (5th Cir. 2001); see also McFarland v. Texas, 
928 S. W.2d 482, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)( en banc), abrogated by Mosley v. State, 983 S. W.2d 
249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 
80. Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir. 1985). 
81. Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 377-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). 
82. The FTCA is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2006). 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) 
is recognized as preempted by Moore v. Potter, 605 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(preempted for postal workers by the Postal Reorganization Act). 
83. Bolduc v. United States, 402 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2005). 
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
85. ld. § 1346(b)(l). 
86. Bolduc, 402 F.3d at 56. 
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if the "challenged government conduct" has a "parallel in the private sector.,,87 
Further, the behavior must not fall under the discretionary exception to the 
FTCA,88 which allows some government conduct to be sheltered from tort 
liability.89 This exception creates difficulty for wrongful-conviction plaintiffs 
because even though a federal official's actions may have been negligent, the 
official will be protected from suit when the negligent acts resulted from policy 
decisions the official was required to make in his official role. 
The case of Bolduc v. United States illustrates both of these concepts.90 In 
Bolduc, two men were wrongly convicted and incarcerated for a robbery in 
Wisconsin.91 They spent eight years in prison before the actual perpetrator was 
identified.92 After their release, they sued the United States for the negligence 
of an agent who withheld evidence that would have exculpated them and for the 
negligent supervision of the agent by the agent's supervisor.93 In a bench trial, 
the court denied the claim, and the claimants appealed.94 In affirming the district 
court opinion, the First Circuit Court of Appeals first analyzed the negligence 
claim.95 The court applied Wisconsin negligence law96 and concluded that the 
claim failed under Wisconsin law "[b]ecause Wisconsin's recognition of a 
governmental duty to disclose exculpatory evidence does not ground private 
liability under that state's law."97 That is, Wisconsin could recognize a 
governmental duty to disclose exculpatory information. But to prevail, the 
plaintiffs needed to show-and could not-that Wisconsin 
imposed private liability on a prosecutor or other state agent for a failure 
to disclose eXCUlpatory evidence. That is a fatal flaw, for the federal 
government does not yield its immunity with respect to obligations that 
87. See id. (citing Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. United States, 112 F.3d 532, 536-37 (1st Cir. 
1997)). 
88. The FTCA's discretionary exception section, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), states that 
[t]he provisions of this chapter and section l346(b) of this title shall not apply to ... 
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, 
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such 
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency 
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 
There are other exceptions, but this one is commonly encountered by wrongful-conviction 
plaintiffs. 
89. Bolduc, 402 F.3d at 60. 
90. See id. at 55-56. 
91. Id. at 53. 
92. /d. at 54. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. /d. at 56. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 57. 
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are peculiar to governments or official-capacity state actors and which 
have no private counterpart in state law.98 
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Next, the court analyzed the claim of negligent supervision, which failed 
because the FBI's supervision ofthe agent fell under the discretionary function 
exception to the FTCA. 99 The court reasoned that government agencies need to 
be able to carry out certain activities without constant threat of suit. 100 A court 
reviews "whether the conduct itself is discretionary, that is, 'a matter of choice 
for the acting employee. ",101 If so, the court then looks to see if that exercise of 
discretion involves policymaking because "[0 ]nly if the conduct is both 
discretionary and policy-driven will section 2680(a) strip the court of subject 
matter jurisdiction."102 The agent's supervisors' actions in this case were both 
discretionary and policy-related. Thus, they were protected because "this court 
has recognized, in the context of supervision, that in the absence of a statutory 
or regulatory regime that sets out particulars as to how an agency must fulfill its 
mandate, the development and management of a supervisory model is a matter 
of agency discretion.,,103 As a result, the United States could not be liable. 
As Bolduc illustrates, it is very difficult for wrongful-conviction plaintiffs to 
show that an official's actions would subject the official to liability ifhe were a 
private person. If plaintiffs succeed in making this link, more likely than not, the 
official's actions will be protected under the discretionary function exception. 
In sum, private bills afford relief to few. Litigation is slow, costly, and 
uncertain. Adele Bernhard, who has championed compensation for the 
wrongfully convicted since 1999,104 notes that "litigation has yielded mixed 
results. Few exonerated individuals have been compensated. And ... others, no 
more deserving, have received enonnous awards. ,,105 But until all states have fair 
and easily accessible compensation statutes, litigation-whether § 1983 federal 
suits or state common law tort suits-remains an essential tool for exonerees. 106 
2. The Fourth Avenue, State Compensation Statutes, Holds the Most 
Promise, But Overly Restrictive Requirements Create Hardships for 
Exonerees.-The fourth avenue of redress for the wrongly incarcerated is to sue 
for compensation under a state wrongful-conviction compensation statute. State 
compensation statutes offer the promise of speedier and more equitable damage 
awards. It is the premise of this Article that states without compensation statutes 
should pass them. This section comments on two features of some existing 
98. ld. 
99. ld. at 62. 
100. ld. at 60 (citing United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984)). 
101. Id. (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,536 (1988)). 
102. ld. 
103. ld. at 61. 
104. See generally Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 7. 
105. Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 7, at 707 (citations omitted). 
106. Indeed, one of Bernhard's goals is to "encourage more litigation" using new theories 
based on creative strategies. ld. at 726-27. 
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statutes that are challenging for exonerees: (1) actual innocence; and (2) possible 
reductions in awards under compensation statutes should the exoneree also win 
a § 1983 suit. 
a. Actual innocence.--Compensation statutes, also called enabling 
statutes,107 enable the exoneree to sue the state itself on the ground that the 
exoneree was wrongfully incarcerated and should be compensated. Twenty-five 
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have passed enabling 
statutes. 108 The exoneree must meet various requirements, depending on the 
state. 109 Under all the statutes, an exoneree must demonstrate his innocence of 
the crime for which he was convicted. 
Wrongful-conviction compensation statutes generally have four 
requirements. First, the exoneree must have been convicted of a 
crime-typically, a felony. 110 Second, under most statutes, the claimant must not 
have pleaded guilty to the charged offense. III Third, the claimant must have been 
sentenced to incarceration and have actually served time as a result of the 
conviction.112 Fourth, the claimant must establish actual-also called 
factual-innocence. 
The goal of the fourth requirement is to ensure that the claimant is actually 
innocent. Establishing factual innocence calls for "an official act declaring a 
defendant not guilty of a crime for which he or she had previously been 
107. See Zaremski, supra note 6, at 436. 
108. Bernhard, supra note 47, at 409 n.49 (citing Compensating the Wrongly Convicted Fact 
Sheet, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.orgiContentlCompensating_ 
The_ Wrongly_Convicted.php (last visited Feb. 13,2011». 
1 09. New Hampshire is one state whose statute does not provide the elements of a prima facie 
case. The exoneree may choose an administrative remedy or a judicial remedy, under which the 
exoneree brings an action against the state "for time unjustly served in the state prison when a 
person is found to be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 541-B:14 (2007 & Supp. 2009). Maryland requires that an exoneree receive a full pardon. The 
pardon must state that the conviction was conclusively demonstrated to have been in error. MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-50 1 (b) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
110. E.g., ALA. CODE § 29-2-156 (2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (2010). However, New 
York permits claims based on misdemeanor convictions. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b.2 (McKinney 
2003 & Supp. 20 11). An Illinois court has interpreted the "crime" requirement of705 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.) to be satisfied by any offense for 
which an exoneree suffered wrongful imprisonment. Smith v. State, 26 Ill. Ct. Cl. 290, 298 (West 
1969). 
Ill. For example, the Iowa statute defines a "wrongfully imprisoned person" as one who "did 
not plead guilty to the public offense charged, or to any lesser included offense, but was convicted 
by the court or by a jury ofan offense classified as an aggravated misdemeanor or felony." IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 663A.I(l)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). An Oklahoma statute 
requires that the exoneree be charged with the commission of a felony and that he not have pleaded 
guilty. OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2010 2d Reg. Sess.). 
112. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (LEXIS through 2010 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 
8-b.3 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1. 
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convicted.,,113 In 2005, Samuel Gross and colleagues published results ofa study 
of the 340 exonerations that took place in the United States between 1989 and 
2003. 114 Gross identified four specific types of official acts by which the 
defendants in the study were exonerated. These official acts were gubernatorial 
pardons, court dismissal of charges, acquittal at retrial, and posthumous state 
acknowledgment of innocence. 115 However, not all state statutes recognize all 
four forms. In five states, the only acceptable official act to establish factual 
innocence is a pardon from the governor, regardless of any other proof of 
innocence that exists. 116 This stringent requirement can lead to harsh results. To 
illustrate, consider the 340 exonerations studied by Gross. In the exonerations 
of these 340 people, governors issued forty-two pardons. 117 Under all existing 
compensation statutes, those forty-two exonerees who were lucky enough to 
receive pardons would be eligible to sue or otherwise apply for compensation. 
But under the statutes of the five states requiring pardons, the remaining 
exonerees would not have been eligible for compensation because they were not 
pardoned by governors. I IS Courts dismissed criminal charges in the cases of263 
of the 340 exonerees. 119 Thirty-one exonerees were acquitted at retrials. 120 Four 
exonerees died in prison; their innocence was posthumously acknowledged. 121 
What this means is that under the compensation statutes requiring pardons, 298 
people out of the 340 who were exonerated-298 people officially declared not 
guilty of a crime-would receive no compensation because a governor did not 
give them a pardon. Such a stringent requirement makes it unnecessarily difficult 
for wrongfully incarcerated persons to establish innocence. 
In addition to the four official acts establishing factual innocence that Gross 
113. Gross et ai., supra note 1, at 524. 
114. Id. at 523-24. 
115. ld. Texas posthumously exonerated Timothy Cole in 2009, ten years after his death in 
prison. He received a posthumous pardon on March I, 2010. Cole, a college student, was 
convicted in 1985 of raping a Texas Tech student and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. He 
was cleared by DNA evidence in 2008, exonerated in 2009, and pardoned in 2010. Texas Governor 
Rick Perry granted him a full pardon on Monday, March 1,2010, as soon as he received a legal 
opinion from the Texas attorney general saying that the governor had such authority. See Timothy 
Cole: A Tragic Story Begets Hope for the Future, INNOCENCE PROJECT OF TEx., http://www. 
ipoftexas.orglindex.php?action=<timothy-cole (last visited Feb. 14,2011). 
116. Boucher, supra note I, at 1085 n.l13 (listing the five states that require pardons: 
California, Illinois, Maine .• < '",hond, and North Carolina). 
117. Gross et aI., Sl., ~ • 524. 
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490lJ \_:>10); 705lLL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West, Westlaw 
through 2010 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2) (West, Westlaw through 2009 
2d Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., STATEFIN.&PROC. § 10-501 (West, Westlawthrough 2010 Reg. 
Sess.); see also N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(6); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (LEXIS through 2010 Reg. 
Sess.); 88 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 03-007 (2003). 
119. Gross et aI., supra note 1, at 524. 
120. ld. 
121. ld. 
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described in 2003, some statutes require yet another official act before the 
exoneree may be considered for compensation. Namely, the claimant must 
produce proof from the trial court that he was innocent of the crime. 122 Ohio 
does not require a gubernatorial pardon, but it does require an express finding of 
innocence. The claimant must secure a "determin[ation] by a court of common 
pleas that the offense of which the individual was found guilty ... either was not 
committed by the individual or was not committed by any person.,,123 Maine 
requires not only that the exoneree receive a full pardon,124 but also that the 
exoneree be found innocent by a COurt. 125 However, not all states require such 
restrictive proof of innocence as Maine does. Alabama, for example, does not 
require an express finding of innocence. The claimant must demonstrate that the 
conviction was vacated or reversed and that the accusatory instrument was 
dismissed either on the ground of innocence or a ground "consistent with 
innocence.,,126 By comparison, New Jersey requires that the claimant show that 
he "did not commit" the crime.127 
Atypically, New York's scheme allows for a claim based not only on pardons 
and factual innocence, but also on legal innocence. 128 To succeed on a claim of 
legal innocence, a claimant must show that the alleged facts did not constitute a 
felony or misdemeanor against the state. 129 This is a less restrictive standard; 
most statutes require that the exoneree not have committed acts that constitute 
a felony.13o Although committing acts that do not constitute a felony seems to 
correspond to not committing acts that do constitute a felony, it might be easier 
to demonstrate that actions did not equal a felony than to demonstrate that no 
actions were taken. 
Inequalities exist in the kind and amount of compensation as well as in the 
standards for establishing innocence. Some statutes determine an exoneree's 
compensation on a case-by-case basis. 131 Some award a set amount regardless 
122. Haddad v. Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., No. 0IAP-I130, 2002 WL 1163917, at *2-3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. June 4, 2002). Although unpublished, Haddad has been cited in a later-also 
unpublished--decision. See Mickey v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., No. 02AP-539, 2003 WL 
116152, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14,2003). 
123. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation). 
124. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241 (2)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2009 2d Reg. Sess.). 
125. Id. § 8241(2)(d). At the time of the Gross study, Maine had not exonerated anyone. 
126. ALA. CODE § 29-2-157(2) (2003). 
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-2 (2011). 
128. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b.3 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2011). 
129. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1) (McKinney 2005) sets forth the grounds for setting 
aside convictions; see also id. § 470.20(1)-(3), (5) (McKinney 2009). 
130. E.g., ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(e); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
52:4C-3(b); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(t)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.). 
131. E.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b.6; TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (West, Westlaw 
through 2010 Reg. Sess.) (lifetime limit of$1 million); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g). 
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of the length of time the exoneree was in prison. I32 Others award a set amount 
based on the length of the wrongful incarceration. 133 
One consistent aspect of compensation statutes is that innocence will not be 
considered established if reversal occurred merely because of procedural or 
jurisdictional errors. In Walden v. State, the Ohio Supreme Court described a 
defendant's acquittal in a criminal trial as "a determination that the state has not 
met its burden of proof on the essential elements of the crime. It is not 
necessarily a finding that the accused is innocent.,,134 Claimants are consistently 
required to establish that the conviction was reversed on relevant grounds. 135 
Relevant grounds do not include the following: claims of double j eopardy; 136 
"not guilty by reason of insanity;,,137 a court's failure to comply with provisions 
of the criminal statute;138 the fact that the statute under which a claimant was 
convicted was later found unconstitutional; 139 or that the convicting court lacked 
jurisdiction. 
Though focusing on the jurisdictional issue, the case of Osborn v. United 
States l40 illustrates the requirement that the claimant must demonstrate either that 
he did not commit the act or that the act he committed did not constitute a crime. 
In Osborn, four servicemen already court-martialed and in prison for other 
offenses were charged with premeditated murder of a fellow inmate under the 
92nd Article of War. After being found guilty, one of the co-defendants filed a 
habeas corpus petition on the ground that under the 92nd Article of War, courts-
martial did not have jurisdiction over trials for rape or murder during 
peacetime. 141 The court granted the petition because the nation had been at peace 
when the defendants were charged and court-martialed. 142 Co-defendant Osborn 
then filed his own habeas motion, the granting of which resulted in his discharge 
from prison. 143 Then Osborn sued the United States for wrongful 
132. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. § 541-B:14 (2007 & Supp. 2010). 
133. E.g., ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904; 705 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 
505/8(c) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.) (amount varies with length of time 
incarcerated); TEX. CN. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a)-(b) (West, Westlawthrough 2009 
Reg. Leg.). 
134. Walden v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962, 966 (Ohio 1989). 
135. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-422(1) (2011). 
136. Fudger v. State, 520 N.Y.S.2d 950, 952-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
137. See generally Ebberts v. State Bd. of Control, 148 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
138. Mickey v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., No. 02AP-539, 2003 WL 116152, at *4 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Jan. 14,2003) (holding that lower court failed to comply with § 2967.28(B)(3) of the Ohio 
Code). 
139. Lambert v. State Claims Bd., No. 78-306, 1979 WL 30360, at *1-2 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) 
(fmding that the claimant had violated the statute when it was in effect). 
140. 322 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1963). 
141. Id. at 837-38. 
142. Id. at 838. 
143. Id. 
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imprisonment. l44 The district court "found that the record showed that the 
plaintiffs conviction had not been reversed or set aside upon the stated ground 
of innocence and unjust conviction, and that Osborn had failed to show that he 
had not committed the acts with which he was charged.,,14s The court of appeals 
affirmed. 146 At best, Osborn could demonstrate that he was discharged because 
the court-martial lacked jurisdiction. That showing would not satisfy the 
wrongful conviction statute; Osborn could not demonstrate that he did not 
commit the murder, and he also could not demonstrate that the act of murder did 
not constitute a crime. 147 In short, whether federal or state, wrongful-conviction 
compensation statutes are intended to "separate those who were wrongfully 
imprisoned from those who have merely avoided criminal liability." 148 
As important as it is for states to pass enabling legislation for exoneree 
compensation, it is equally important that they analyze the need for onerous 
requirements and widely varying calculation methods. Exonerees may be shut 
out of compensation because of needlessly strict requirements even in states that 
have passed compensation statutes. Relatively few exonerees succeed in 
establishing all the elements required under compensation statutes. Widely 
varying requirements for establishing innocence or determining compensation 
make recovery more difficult for some exonerees than for others merely based 
on where they live. 149 Thus, a goal of statutory revision should be to create 
consistency among statutes. 
b. Possible reductions in compensation statute awards should the exoneree 
also win a § 1983 lawsuit.-State compensation statutes may require as a 
condition of compensation that the exoneree agree to give up the third avenue of 
legal redress,lso which is to bring suit against the state on common law tort 
theories. This is a reasonable requirement because the point of the compensation 
statute is to streamline and make more certain the exoneree's route to 
compensation. lsl 
A New York case suggests that courts may treat § 1983 suits the same way 
by offsetting one award against another should an exoneree win a § 1983 suit and 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 842-43. 
147. Id. at 842. 
148. Walden v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962, 967 (Ohio 1989). 
149. An Iowa statute allows a claim to go forward after the exoneree obtains a district court 
order adjudging the exoneree to be a ''wrongfully imprisoned person." IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.l 
(West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). Other statutes (those of California, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, and North Carolina, noted supra note 118) require pardons from the governor. 
150. See supra Part I1I.A.I. 
151. In at least once instance, however, a court ruled that separate causes of action for the same 
wrongful imprisonment could go forward (under the state compensation statute and the state tort 
claims act) ifnegligence by a state employee was responsible for the wrongful imprisonment "based 
on acts or omissions apart from the process responsible for the conviction and wrongful 
imprisonment." Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 215 (Iowa 2004). 
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attempt to claim compensation under a state statute as well. In Carter v. State, 
an exoneree was compensated under § 1983 for wrongful conviction.152 He also 
brought suit under New York's Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act, which 
is part of the state's Court of Claims Act. The appellate court ruled that the 
exoneree's recovery under § 1983 barred recovery under the state's statutory 
compensation remedy. 153 The court reasoned that the success of the claimant's 
suit under § 1983 showed that he was not a person "frustrated in seeking legal 
redress," which was the class of persons the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment 
Act sought to protect. 154 Further, the claimant could not recover because he had 
already been compensated for the injuries resulting from his wrongful 
conviction. ISS Thus, exonerees with state statutory remedies may choose to file 
§ 1983 lawsuits anyway, but they should be aware of the potential for offsets in 
their statutory damage awards. 
B. Theoretical Justifications Support the Payment of Compensation 
Once a wrongfully convicted person has been found innocent, the state 
should pay compensation. Two theoretical justifications-the instrumental and 
corrective justice theories-support the payment by a state to an exoneree. 
Compensation statutes arose in the context of providing aid to crime 
victims. 156 The goal of compensation statutes for crime victims is to "give 
financial or other aid to victims or their survivors.,,157 Such statutes grew out of 
a "rights theoryl58 positing that a state that fails 'to protect its citizens from crime 
is obligated to provide compensation to those who become victims. ",159 Funding 
these statutes, however, may complicate compensation for wrongly convicted 
persons. Statutes that provide compensation for crime victims do so through 
fines imposed on criminal wrongdoers. 160 In the case of wrongly convicted 
152. Carter v. State, 546 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. (quoting N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1) (McKinney 1989)). 
155. Id. However, in at least one case, an exoneree did have the right to pursue both a § 1983 
remedy and a state statutory remedy. See, e.g., State v. Oakley, 181 S.W.3d 855,857 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2005) (granting rule 53.7(t) motion), ajf'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 227 S.W.3d 
58 (Tex. 2007). 
156. Federal crime victim compensation statutes have been in place in this country since the 
1980s; similar state statutes have been in place since the 1990s. Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong 
Place, Wrong Time, Un/air Treatment? Aid to Victims o/Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.1. 83, 
87 n.17 (2001). 
157. Id. at 87. Compensation statutes provide aid to the victim; by contrast, under restitution 
statutes, victims or their survivors can seek restitution from the perpetrator. 
158. This "rights theory" is the same as the corrective justice theory (see infra Part 111.8.2); 
it supports compensation for victims of the criminal justice system no less than for victims of crime. 
159. Mostaghel, supra note 156, at 87 (quoting Charlene L. Smith, Victim Compensation: 
Hard Questions and Suggested Remedies, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 51, 62 (1985)). 
160. Id. at 87. 
524 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:503 
persons, there is no easily targeted actor to fine, as there is when the harm is done 
by a criminal wrongdoer. But if the state should make amends to those it fails to 
protect from crime, it should equally make amends to those it fails to protect 
from its own processes when they go awry.161 
"[S]tates have no legal obligation to remedy the injuries of the wrongly 
convicted."162 For example, New York's Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment 
Act, providing compensation under the state's Court of Claims Act, "discharge [ s] 
a moral obligation of the State."163 Alberto Lopez suggests that the motivation 
that underlies crime victim compensation statutes could form a basis for 
improved state compensation for wrongly convicted persons. 164 If the state feels 
morally compelled to pass crime victim compensation statutes to "spread out the 
cost of hardship" on victims harmed by private individuals, it should feel an even 
stronger moral compulsion "to indemnify the unjustly convicted person and 
spread out the cost of the harm inflicted" when "it is the failure of the state itself 
that damaged the victim.,,165 
The rights theory that underlies crime victim compensation statutes and 
carries over to wrongful-conviction compensation statutes "can be based in tort 
or contract.,,166 Under the contract theory, "citizens have actions for breach of 
contract if society fails to protect them because they have given up the individual 
right to exact retribution from a wrongdoer in return for society's protection."167 
Under tort theory, "if the State breaches its duty to protect citizens, the injured 
citizens would have actions against the State for damages in tort.,,168 The rights 
theory as expressed in wrongful-conviction compensation statutes takes the form 
of tort, rather than contract, actions. 
1. The Instrumental Theory o/Tort Liability.-The instrumental theory is 
one of the two main theories underlying tort liability.169 In the very broadest 
terms, under the instrumental theory, the threat ofliability is a lever to make an 
actor act in a way that avoids liability. Under this theory, holding a private 
tortfeasor liable creates in the tortfeasor "an incentive to make cost-justified 
investments in safety.,,17o Holding a government liable creates "an economic 
161. "The reparation of damages caused by erroneous criminal accusations, irrespective ofhow 
well founded they seemed, is properly a cost of the operation of the criminal justice system. It is 
difficult to see why the innocent victims should be forced to absorb this cost." Boucher, supra note 
1, at 1101 n.235 (quoting Keith S. Rosenn, Compensating the Innocent Accused, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 
705,716 (1976)). 
162. Lopez, supra note 4, at 709. 
163. Carter v. State, 546 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
164. See Lopez, supra note 4, at 710-11. 
165. Id. 
166. Mostaghel, supra note 156, at 87. 
167. ld. at 88 (citing Smith, supra note 159, at 63). 
168. ld. (citing Smith, supra note 159, at 62). 
169. Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, 
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 798 (2007). 
170. Id. at 823. 
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incentive for the government and its officials to make cost-justified investments 
in preventing constitutional violations."171 This theory is based on the view that 
behavior is affected by the existence of economic consequences. 
Nevertheless, according to Lawrence Rosenthal, governments are rarely 
motivated by economic consequences. Rosenthal summarizes the arguments of 
Professor Daryl Levinson to make this point. 172 Levinson does not believe that 
the instrumental theory of tort liability applies to governments. He believes that 
governments respond to political-not financial-incentives, caring more about 
votes than dollars. 173 Governments may therefore tolerate behavior that violates 
the Constitution because that behavior garners political advantage. 174 Levinson 
gives the example of randomly searching young men in high crime areas-a 
policy which, despite the likelihood of Fourth Amendment violations, "could also 
pay such handsome political dividends that liability would have no deterrent 
effect on elected officials.,,175 Myriad examples spring to mind, including racial 
profiling to look for drug dealers or ethnic profiling to search airline passengers. 
Thus, in Levinson's view, as long as there is a political payoff, governments 
would rather continue unconstitutional behavior and pay tort damages to 
plaintiffs injured by those violations. 176 
According to Rosenthal, Levinson's views have generated some negative 
reactions among academics,177 but apparently much more approbation.178 In 
Rosenthal's words, "[m]ost academics have been persuaded by Levinson; it has 
now become fashionable to warn that the consequences of imposing damages 
liability on government are uncertain at best.,,179 Rosenthal himself disagrees 
with this conclusion. I so Based on an examination of the political significance of 
liability to elected officials, he posits a theory of political behavior that elected 
officials primarily use the public resources over which they have control in their 
attempts to gain re-election. lSI In attempting to be re-elected, "elected officials 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 824. 
173. Id. (citing Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 420 (2000)). 
174. Id. (citing Levinson, supra note 173, at 367-68). 
175. Id. (quoting Levinson, supra note 173, at 369-70). 
176. Id. at 825. Levinson believes that tort liability for constitutional torts could not be 
imposed on governments under the corrective justice theory either (see discussion infra Part 
III.B.2), since payment would ultimately come from taxpayers. Id. He seems to be saying that the 
moral responsibility would be the government's, but the government would not deem this 
responsibility a reason to change behavior because the burden of payment would fall on taxpayers. 
This is indeed a problem in the funding of current compensation statutes, and I suggest a remedy 
in Part IV. 
177. Id. at 827-29. 
178. Id. at 830. 
179. Id. 
180. See id. at 831. 
181. See id. at 832. 
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will be highly sensitive to tort liability"182 because defending against and paying 
for tort liability takes away resources from other projects. 183 As a result, elected 
officials will be "willing to make investments in loss prevention in order to 
reduce governmental liability costS."I84 
The stumbling block in the path of Rosenthal's theory could be that 
governments protect themselves through immunity legislation.18s Rosenthal 
addresses this problem. Analyzing a litany of objections to the theory, he 
ultimately concludes that the ubiquity of immunity legislationl86 shows that 
government officials are very aware of the liability costs of unconstitutional 
behavior and want to limit those costS.187 Thus, he argues, the instrumental 
justification theory supports tort liability for governments. 188 Even though the 
desire to minimize costs is primarily accomplished through immunity statutes, 
governmental tort liability has an instrumental justification; it creates an 
incentive on the part of officeholders to allocate resources to loss 
prevention. There should be a clear political incentive to invest in loss 
prevention at least when the cost of avoiding an injury is small, the 
likelihood of injury is great, and the impact on the government's budget 
is likely to be large. 189 
Ifthere is such an incentive to prevent loss, another question arises: why do 
states still continue to shield themselves behind immunity laws? Rosenthal's 
answer to this question is that it is a matter of costs versus benefits.190 The 
political cost of spending money on loss prevention may be greater than the 
actual "dollars and cents" cost. Thus, the instrumental theory supports tort 
liability for governments; it is just not a very efficient means of getting 
governments to take liability for their torts. Indeed, according to Rosenthal, 
"Professor Levinson was right to claim that governmental tort liability has no 
efficiency justification comparable to the role of tort liability in the private 
sector.,,191 
How does the instrumental theory of tort liability apply to wrongful-
conviction compensation statutes? On the one hand, the instrumental theory 
supports the creation of compensation statutes and a concomitant chinking of the 
armor of government immunity. Compensation statutes do not seem to carry a 
high political cost, and they provide several advantages to states: states with 




185. See supra Part 1II.A.l (discussing the Federal Tort Claims Act). 
186. See Rosenthal, supra note 169, at 838. 
187. See id. at 841. 
188. Id. at 842. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 799. 
191. Id. at 842. 
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awards in lawsuits; and there should be fewer wrongful convictions. On the 
other hand, the instrumental theory ofliability does not seem to be a very strong 
underpinning for current compensation statutes. If it were-that is, if a 
compensation statute really acted like a lever to make a government actor behave 
a certain way-then we would see the implementation within these statutes of 
suggestions designed to change behavior. This is not the case. For example, 
states have not implemented the suggestion that funding for compensation 
statutes should come from the prosecutor's budgetl 92 as a way of curbing 
overzealous prosecutors. The reason typically given-that the prosecutor in 
office at the time of a wrongful conviction may no longer be there when the fine 
is imposed193-shows that changing officials' behavior is not a goal of 
compensation statutes. Because states seem to ignore rather than harness a 
compensation statute's behavior-changing ability, it appears that most states' 
compensation statutes are not based on the instrumental theory of tort liability. 
2. The Corrective Justice Theory of Tort Liability.-Moral rather than 
economic concerns animate the second major theory of tort liability: that of 
corrective justice. Under the corrective justice theory, imposing tort damages on 
individuals "embodies a widely accepted moral obligation on the part of a 
wrongdoer to make the injured party whole.,,194 Imposing tort damages on the 
government is "based on an asserted moral entitlement to compensation when 
one has been the victim of a constitutional wrong.,,195 All of the current 
wrongful-conviction compensation statutes rest on the corrective justice theory 
of tort liability. 
Corrective justice is the theoretical justification for finding a moral 
obligation. The vehicle for achieving corrective justice is strict liability-
perhaps "the most philosophically and procedurally sound [ theory] for imposing 
192. See, e.g., Evan J. Mandery, Efficiency Considerations o/Compensating the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 41 NO.3 CRIM. L. BULL., ART. 4, at 1 (2005). Mandery's article opens with a bang: 
"Here is a simple, seemingly obvious response to the mounting evidence that innocents are being 
convicted at an intolerable rate: make prosecutors pay for their mistakes regardless of fault." Id. 
193. Rosenthal, supra note 169, at 835 & 835 nn.152-53. 
For example, it is reasonable to believe that the time frame of concern to politicians is 
the next electoral cycle and that their political judgments are therefore made with only 
that time frame in mind. For that reason, elected officials might ignore litigation costs 
or liability exposure, believing that they have no real ability to reduce them quickly 
enough to affect the current electoral cycle. 
/d. (citing James M. Buchanan & Dwight R. Lee, Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political 
Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 344, 345-50 (1982)). On the other hand, 
Rosenthal continues that "there is reason for skepticism about this view of the time horizons of 
public officials-most politicians likely plan long careers in public service and will pay a political 
price if they are still in office when tort judgments must be paid." Id. 
194. Id. at 823. 
195. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes constitutional error in wrongful conviction cases, 
see Garrett, supra note 11. 
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liability on a state.,,196 As explained by Lauren Boucher, "[t]he strict liability 
theory assumes that in 'any great undertaking ... there are bound to be a number 
of accidents. ",197 Further, 
[b ]ecause all citizens benefit from the operation of the criminal justice 
system (in the form of increased public safety), it is unfair that only one 
person should bear the cost of an error such as wrongful incarceration 
simply because he was the unlucky victim of the mistake. Instead, 
everyone should bear the burden equally. 198 
Arguing for the passage of compensation statutes in 1999, Adele Bernhard 
discussed cases showing "that innocent people have been, and will continue to 
be, unjustly convicted, as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the 
routine operation of the criminal justice system.,,199 In her view, "neither 
traditional fault-based tort actions nor civil rights statutes provide a remedy"200 
for unjust conviction. Under strict liability, however, there is no need to 
determine fault. Strict liability works well because 
it is the state, through operation of one of its most essential services-the 
criminal justice system-that has inflicted the harm. Although it may be 
impossible to hold any individual law enforcement officer, or any 
particular municipality, liable, the state's responsibility for the injury is 
sufficient to generate a moral obligation.201 
The current wrongful-conviction compensation statutes, all based on strict 
liability, "do not require claimants to discover why the prosecution was 
erroneous, or who made mistakes which 'caused' the investigation to go awry, 
or even what those mistakes might have been. ,,202 
C. Pragmatic Objections to Payment of Compensation Do Not Hold Up 
Although theoretical bases support the government's payment of 
compensation to the wrongly convicted, those who do not believe that the 
government must provide such compensation generally present a pragmatic 
argument to support their view. However, the primary justification offered does 
not hold up under scrutiny, and strong pragmatic reasons exist to support the 
payment of compensation. The justification offered for inadequate compensation 
statutes or for none at all derives from the view that the state cannot right every 
196. John J. Johnston, Note, Reasonover v. Washington: Toward a Just Treatment of the 
Wrongly Convicted in Missouri, 68 UMKC L. REV. 411, 414 (2000). 
197. Boucher, supra note 1, at 110 1 (quoting Edwin Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of 
Criminal Justice, 21 B.U. L. REv. 201, 208 (1941». 
198. Id. (citing Borchard, supra note 197, at 208). 
199. Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 7, at 92. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 93. 
202. Bernhard, supra note 47, at 409. 
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wrong. "The state cannot be expected to compensate every citizen forced to bear 
an unjust burden within its boundaries: '[c]ertain harms are simply accepted as 
part of life. ",203 This is the cost-of-doing-business argument, an argument that 
accepts that innocent people can and will be imprisoned as an unavoidable aspect 
of the justice system. The cost-of-doing-business argument should be repudiated 
for four reasons: (I) it does not save the state money; (2) it leads to treatment 
that is unfair; (3) it creates incentives to continue the unfair treatment; and (4) it 
leads states to violate the Constitution. 
1. The Cost-of-Doing-Business Argument to Avoid Passing Compensation 
Statutes Does Not Save the State Money.-Accepting a cost-of-doing-business 
rationale does not save the state money. The most common justification for the 
cost-of-doing-business rationale is that it will strain state budgets to provide 
compensation to wrongly incarcerated persons who win their freedom.204 
Perhaps this fear stems from occasional highly publicized lawsuits that gamer 
million dollar settlements for wrongfully incarcerated individuals.205 It has 
similarly been feared that compensation schemes for crime victims will create 
high award and management costS.206 That has not turned out to be the case with 
crime victim compensation statutes,207 and neither will it be the case with 
compensation statutes for the wrongfully convicted. 
A look at compensation statistics demonstrates that the fiscal argument fails. 
Gross's study of exonerations between 1989 and 2003 found that four 
states-Illinois, New York, Texas, and California-accounted for more than 
forty percent of the total of 340 exonerations.20s Illinois had fifty-four 
exonerations, New York had thirty-five, Texas had twenty-eight, and California 
had twenty-seven.209 Considering just these four states, this is an average of 
thirty-six exonerations per state over a fourteen year period, which in turn is 
between two and three per state per year, a number that cannot reasonably be 
claimed will break the bank. 
A look at DNA statistics also bears out that compensation awards will not 
bankrupt states.2IO The number of people imprisoned without DNA analysis to 
203. Boucher, supra note 1, at 1100 n.226 (quoting Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 
7, at 92-93). 
204. Fite, supra note 8, at 1191 (citing Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 7, at 105-06). 
205. See cases set out in Garrett, supra note 11, at 44 n.32 (including some awards of up to 
$8.26 million). 
206. Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 7, at 100. Bernhard specifically mentions the 
opinion of former New York State Assistant District Attorney Richard Kuh, expressed at legislative 
hearings in New York on crime victim legislation. Id. 
207. See id. at 101. However, this may be because "[r]estitution has been recognized as one 
of the 'most underenforced victim rights' available through the criminal justice system." Julie 
Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9I}} World, 79 TvL. L. REv. 167, 179 (2004). 
208. Gross et aI., supra note 1, at 541. 
209. Id. at 541 tbI.2. 
210. DNA evidence was used to establish innocence in nearly half of the exonerations from 
1989 to 2003. Boucher, supra note I, at 1070 (citing Gross et aI., supra note 1, at 524). 
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establish their innocence is dwindling-either those cases have now had DNA 
analysis, or those prisoners are dying. As it becomes more common to do DNA 
testing on physical evidence at the investigatory stage, according to Bernhard, 
"the rate of DNA exonerations will inevitably slow. The number of convicted 
inmates who can locate material, relevant, and untested forensic material will 
dwindle, as will the number of individuals claiming compensation for unjust 
conviction.,,211 
Along with fearing the cost of implementation, another motivation for states 
to pass grudging statutes--or none at all-is the fear that a state will compensate 
people who do not deserve to be compensated.212 This fear is also unfounded 
because "[l]egislatures can carefully draft a statute to prevent unwarranted claims 
from being considered."213 Under all compensation statutes, procedural 
requirements are rigorously enforced.214 And "[w]hile statutory provisions are 
designed to compensate the wrongfully incarcerated, they still require the 
plaintiff to meet a high burden of proof before compensation will be granted.,,215 
Claimants therefore may not simply restate trial evidence.216 The claim of 
innocence "shall be verified by the claimant;"217 this cannot be done with 
"conclusory and self-serving testimony.,,218 Rather, claimants must fulfill 
statutory requirements to establish actual innocence, requirements that function 
to keep those whose convictions were overturned on procedural grounds from 
recovering.219 
A further safeguard for states is the role of trial courts. According to the 
Iowa Supreme Court, the district court's "predicate review and assessment of the 
211. Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 7, at 715. 
212. Boucher, supra note 1, at 1098. 
213. Id. at 1099. Boucher also points out that compensation statutes do not result in 
immediate and unquestioned state compensation, but rather, they create a cause of action. Id. She 
quotes a provision of the Ohio Code to illustrate: 
Notwithstanding any provisions of this chapter to the contrary, a wrongfully imprisoned 
individual has and may file a civil action against the state, in the court of claims, to 
recover a sum of money as described in this section, because of the individual's 
wrongful imprisonment. The court of claims shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction 
over such a civil action. 
Id. at 1099 n.221 (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(D) (West, Westlaw through 2010 
legislation». 
214. E.g., Dvorak v. Pickaway Corr. lnst., No. 02AP-452, 2002 WL 31656236, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002). 
215. Frederick Lawrence, Declaring Innocence: Use of Declaratory Judgments to Vindicate 
the Wrongly Convicted, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 391, 394-95 (2009). 
216. See, e.g., Fudgerv. State, 520 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
217. E.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(4) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2011). 
218. Vasquez v. State, 693 N.Y.S.2d 220, 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
219. See Michael J. Saks et ai., Toward a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of 
Erroneous Convictions, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 669, 682 (2001); see also discussion supra Part 
1II.A.2.a. 
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claim ... permits the district court to serve as a gatekeeper.'>220 A claimant may 
not deprive the court of its gatekeeper role. In an Ohio case, a defendant found 
to have acted in self-defense was acquitted of a murder charge.221 She argued 
that under collateral estoppel, she could sue for compensation without 
establishing actual innocence. The court rejected this argument because acquittal 
is an essential step that allows a claimant to get to the gate. Only with the 
acquittal does the court of claims open the gate and give the claimant the 
opportunity to demonstrate actual innocence.222 
States whose requirements are very restrictive, as well as states just 
implementing compensation statutes, should look to states like New York for 
assurance that less restrictive statutes do not result in floods of claims. 223 It does 
not appear that states with well-planned compensation statutes will suffer 
inordinate strains on their budgets. Similarly, it is unlikely that such states will 
compensate those who are not entitled to compensation. 
2. The Cost-of-Doing-Business Argument for Refusing to Pass 
Compensation Statutes Leads to Treatment That Is Unfair.-It is unfair for the 
state to treat wrongful conviction and undeserved time in prison as harms that 
should be "simply accepted as part of life.',224 It is also unfair to expect people 
subjected to months or years of undeserved incarceration to return to their lives 
as if nothing has happened. Moreover, it is wrong for the state to compound the 
harm of wrongful incarceration by adding another harm-namely, release from 
incarceration without any provision for a meaningful return to society. Making 
provision for the wrongfully incarcerated is "[t]he least the community can 
do.',225 Indeed, making such provision should be an integral part of criminal 
justice; "[t]he reparation of damages caused by erroneous criminal accusations 
... is properly a cost of the operation of the criminal justice system. It is 
difficult to see why the innocent victims should be forced to absorb this COSt.,,226 
In clarifying the parameters of New York's compensation statute for the wrongly 
imprisoned, a New York court said that "the evil sought to be remedied was the 
likelihood of no recovery.,,227 No state should tolerate the likelihood that a 
wrongfully convicted person might have no remedy. 
3. The Cost-of-Doing-Business Argumentfor Wrongful Incarceration Leads 
to Moral Hazard.-Accepting the cost-of-doing-business rationale provides no 
incentive for the justice system to stop practices that lead to unfair treatment. 
Thus, this rationale leads to moral hazard. Moral hazard is created when there 
220. State v. McCoy, 742 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Iowa 2007). 
221. Walden v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962,963 (Ohio 1989). 
222. See id. at 966-67. 
223. See Boucher, supra note I, at 1098-99 nn.215-16. 
224. Id. at 1100 n.226. 
225. Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 7, at 112 (quoting EDWIN M. BORCHARD, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 392 (1932)). 
226. Adam I. Kaplan, Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the 
Wrongfully ConVicted, 56 UCLA L. REv. 227, 241 0.86 (quoting Rosenn, supra note 161, at 716). 
227. Carter v. State, 546 N.Y.S.2d 648,650 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
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are no consequences for bad behavior. As columnist David Sirota puts it, 
"without consequences-or worse, with rewards-for wrongdoing, there is an 
incentive to do wrong. ,,228 When the state makes no provision, or only minor 
provision, for released individuals, the state excuses itself from responsibility for 
errors and misconduct in criminal investigations, trials, and sentences. No 
consequences flow from the bad behavior. This lack of consequences effectively 
tells the criminal justice community that errors and misconduct will be 
overlooked. Thus, the state's disinterest creates a moral hazard: an incentive for 
the criminal justice system to continue doing business as usual. When the state 
creates the moral hazard of "bus iness-as-usual," the state will continue to tolerate 
preventable wrongs. Setting free a wrongfully convicted person is the ultimate 
expression that preventable wrongs indeed occurred. Under a cost-of-doing-
business rationale, there is no incentive to eliminate preventable wrongs. 
Courts have a role to play in rejecting the cost-of-doing-business rationale. 
One way to do so is to ensure that there are consequences for wrongdoing. A 
number of trial courts have admonished jurors to ignore prosecutors' improper 
suggestions to the jury.229 Appellate courts have reversed and remanded cases 
because of prosecutors' misconduct230 or improper methods.231 Another way 
courts play such a role is through interpretations ofburden-of-prooflanguage in 
their states' enabling statutes. Under many statutes, exonerees trying to establish 
factual innocence must do so by presenting "clear and convincing evidence. ,,232 
The clear and convincing evidence standard is an elevated standard.233 Three 
statutes, however, direct courts to make allowance for the difficulty of producing 
clear and convincing evidence when claims are brought years after the original 
trials.234 When the statute couples strict requirements with flexibility, courts 
228. David Sirota, Moral Hazards-and Consequences, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 11,2009, at A24, 
available at http://articles.sfgate.coml2009-12-1110pinionll7220728 _1_moral-hazard-senate-
democrats-bernanke. 
229. E.g., Bakerv. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148-49 (Del. 2006); Phelps v. State, 360N.E.2d 191, 
192-93 (Ind. 1977). In Helleson v. State, 5 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the 
prosecutor was told he could mention parole law but could not discuss it in regard to the sentence 
to be determined. When he did, the court told the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks. 
Courts do this routinely, but if not carefully worded, the court's warning to the jury might actually 
make the problem worse by highlighting the improper remarks. People v. Bolden, 589 P.2d 396, 
400 n.5 (Cal. 1979). 
230. E.g., DeFreitas v. State, 701 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
231. Schoels v. State, 966 P.2d 735,743 (Nev. 1998) (Springer, C.J., dissenting). 
232. E.g., ME. REv. STAT., tit. 14, § 8241(2) (West, Westlaw through 2009 2d Reg. Sess.); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(f)(I) (West, Westlaw through 
2011 Reg. Sess.). 
233. "The clear and convincing evidence standard is somewhere between the preponderance 
standard of civil cases and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal cases." In re G.B.R., 953 
S.W.2d 391,396 (Tex Crim. App. 1997). 
234. N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8-b(l) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-l; 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(f). 
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have the tools to issue decisions that whittle away at the cost-of-doing-business 
rationale.235 When statutes are not explicit, a court's understanding oflegislative 
intent may be similarly important. For example, a Louisiana court's 
interpretation was influenced by its understanding that legislative intent did not 
limit "the introduction of evidence related in any way to the conviction and the 
proof of factual innocence.,,236 When statutes are not explicit, courts may 
facilitate consequences for wrongdoing by adopting a preponderance of the 
evidence standard instead of a clear and convincing evidence standard.237 
4. The Cost-ol-Doing Business Argument for Wrongful Incarceration Leads 
States to Violate the Constitution.-Finally, accepting the argument that 
wrongful incarceration is a cost of doing business leads to the ultimate moral 
hazard: the continued acceptance of constitutional violations. In a criminal 
appeal based on constitutional error, the court's focus is "on whether evidence 
of guilt could excuse constitutional error.'>238 In effect, such a focus means that 
the court is balancing the possibility that the accused is guilty against the 
certainty that a constitutional error was committed. Rather than aiming for the 
elimination of constitutional errors from criminal trials, this focus invites the 
routine repetition of constitutional errors. 
Whenever an exoneree succeeds in winning release after years of wrongful 
confinement, sympathy grows among the public for the payment of 
compensation. Tort-based compensation statutes not only respond to this 
sympathy, but also may lead to criminal justice reforms in such areas as mistaken 
235. The New Jersey statute, in discussing the burden of proof that exonerees bear in 
establishing factual innocence, states that 
it is the intent of the Legislature that the court, in exercising its discretion as permitted 
by law regarding the weight and admissibility of evidence submitted pursuant to this 
section, may, in the interest of justice, give due consideration to difficulties of proof 
caused by the passage of time, the death or unavailability of witnesses, the destruction 
of evidence, or other factors not caused by such persons or those acting on their behalf. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1. 
236. In re Williams, 984 So. 2d 789,793 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added). Although 
the result-vacatur of the trial court's award of compensation-was bad for the exoneree, the case 
clarifies the burden of proof and the steps in establishing proof of innocence. 
237. Walden v. State, 547 N .E.2d 962 (Ohio 1989)( applying Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.02 
(West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation)); Duncan v. State, No. 5625, 1972 WL 16790 (Ill. Ct. 
Cl. Apr. 12, 1972) (applying 37 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. § 439.8(c)(1967) and interpreting how to 
prove innocence of the fact ofa crime). A claimant seeking to prove an unjust conviction claim 
carries a heavy burden of "evidence that is neither equivocal nor open to opposing presumptions." 
Solomon v. State, 541 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
238. Garrett, supra note 11, at 38. In the introduction to this article, Garrett explains how the 
development of harmless error rules in criminal cases makes it hard for an accused to establish 
innocence. Id. He says that wrongful conviction lawsuits based on tort liability may have a 
dramatic reformative effect because they may change the "truth-defeating nature" of aspects of 
criminal procedure. Id. at 36. 
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eyewitness identification,239 crime lab error,240 and ineffective assistance of 
counsel.241 Reforms in these areas cut down on the potential for constitutional 
violations. When constitutional violations are perceived to carry a cost, 
justification for the cost of doing business evaporates. 
A wrongful-conviction compensation statute creates incentives that make it 
worthwhile for state actors to conform their conduct to the Constitution. 
Assuming that a compensation statute makes a department of government 
responsible for its constitutional violations, the motivation of that department to 
overlook such violations may diminish. Unconstitutional practices that a 
department might previously have ignored may no longer seem justifiable when 
violations leading to wrongful convictions have consequences for those who 
committed them. 
An argument can be made that imposing consequences on government actors 
for unconstitutional behavior will tie the government's hands. However, 
consequences need not be unlimited. Rosenthal explains this in political terms. 
According to Rosenthal, a constitutional right should not depend on whether the 
right is politically acceptable: 
Inherent in the concept of a constitutional right is that its protection does 
not depend on the political acceptance of the right at stake. Thus, 
political accountability is an unacceptable method for securing 
constitutional rights; the Constitution protects even the unpopular or 
politically inexpedient. ... [A] law of constitutional torts must place 
pressure on the government to conform all of its conduct to the 
Constitution. That does not imply, however, that damages are always 
properly awarded for a constitutional violation. Once one understands 
that the primary virtue of damages awards against the government is to 
create a political incentive to undertake loss prevention, there is ample 
room for damages-limiting doctrines that protect the interests of the 
taxpayers and avoid unwarranted reallocation of scarce public 
resources.242 
This means that passing wrongful-conviction compensation statutes in no way 
ties a government's hands. 
Passing wrongful-conviction compensation statutes will create political 
incentives for loss prevention, i.e., improving criminal justice practices, if part 
of the funding for the damage awards comes from the departments or offices that 
have the most ability to prevent constitutional violations. Some part of the 
damage award must come from police and prosecutor budgets because their 
actions directly create or prevent these violations. But statutory damage caps are 
acceptable because they "preserve political pressure on government to conform 
239. One among many articles dealing with criminal justice reform is Boucher, supra note I, 
at 1074-78. 
240. Id. at 1078-79. 
241. Id. at 1080-82. 
242. Rosenthal, supra note 169, at 856 (internal citation omitted). 
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its conduct to the law but mitigate the anomalies associated with governmental 
damages liability.,,243 The aim of damage statutes should be "[a] regime of 
limited liability that nevertheless imposes a sufficient political price to minimize 
the likelihood of constitutional violations."244 Translated to the compensation 
issue, this means that the government that created the harm then passes a statute 
to give damages for the harm. Because the government must continue to fulfill 
its other roles, the remedy will be limited. But a primary goal of the statute is to 
minimize the likelihood that the government will convict and imprison innocent 
persons. Therefore, the remedy should inflict some pain that matters on the 
"bad" actors. Suggestions such as fining or charging the prosecutor who brought 
the case will not work because that prosecutor may be gone, and no other 
prosecutor will see the remedy as cautionary?45 But taking some portion of the 
compensation money from the budget of prosecutors would exact "a sufficient 
political price,,246 because any prosecutor could expect to lose funding whenever 
damages are awarded. 
D. Pragmatic Reasons Support the Payment o/Compensation 
Refusing to pass generous wrongful-conviction compensation statutes has no 
practical justification. Looked at pragmatically, a refusal to pay compensation 
based on the cost-of-doing-business rationale cannot be justified. Paying 
compensation does not strain state budgets-and not only is refusing to pay 
compensation unfair, it also creates disincentives to improve bad practices and 
leads to constitutional violations. Further, pragmatic reasons exist for putting 
fair and generous compensation statutes into place. 
First, passage of statutes contributes to a rebalancing of priorities. If the state 
does not take adequate steps to compensate the individual harmed by its 
processes, it demonstrates that it lacks responsibility for the errors. The state's 
demonstration that it lacks responsibility allows and even encourages further 
243. Id. at 863. Rosenthal does not illustrate anomalies. A possible example is seen in Rooney 
v. United States, 634 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff Rooney was injured working for a 
contractor hired by the federal government. All three parties were negligent, but the government 
argued it could not be liable for damages "apportionable to its joint tortfeasor, the contractor." Id. 
at 1245. The court said that "[u]nder California law, each concurrent tortfeasor in a ... 
comparative negligence case is jointly liable with the others. This rule applies regardless of the 
apportionability of negligence .... Since each defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of 
Rooney's indivisible injuries, each defendant is liable for the full amount of damages." Id. (internal 
citations omitted). Thus, the court found the government responsible for all damages except the 
thirty percent attributable to the comparative negligence of the plaintiff. The result, according to 
the court, is that "[ w]e are faced with an anomaly which we must accept: the [g]overnment, which 
is the least culpable of the three of the negligent parties, will bear the greatest burden in damages." 
Id. The court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. 
244. Rosenthal, supra note 169, at 863. 
245. See generally Medwed, supra note 9. 
246. Rosenthal, supra note 169, at 863. 
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wrongdoing. Putting wrongful conviction statutes into place signals that the state 
is aware it may make mistakes and that those mistakes may be grave. It also 
signals that those who either commit or do not prevent mistakes in criminal 
process shall bear some responsibility for wrongful convictions. Making it easier 
for an exoneree to receive compensation through statute should result in fewer 
false convictions since prosecutors' offices may be motivated to pay more 
attention to fair trial techniques.247 In fact, compensation statutes should be 
designed to make it easier, not harder, for exonerees to receive compensation.248 
Draconian compensation statutes rest on the argument that a restrictive statute 
will lead to few awards because it is so hard for exonerees to qualify. That 
rationale does not comport with our fundamental understanding of a justice 
system that protects the innocent from the ultimate deprivations: those of life 
and liberty. 
Second, compensation statutes allow governments to forecast costs. Errors 
will occur, which explains the cost-of-doing-business argument. But tolerating 
errors in the criminal justice system under a cost-of-doing-business rationale may 
turn out to be costly for the state as well as unfair to the exoneree whose harm is 
justified under this rationale. Implementing compensation statutes allows the 
state to estimate its costs and not leave itself open to unexpected and potentially 
high damage awards. Passing compensation statutes that streamline the process 
of applying for compensation may lead to lower costs since the state will 
presumably be defending against fewer exoneree common law tort suits against 
prosecutors and § 1983 suits against municipalities and the police. Passing 
compensation statutes that make it easier for exonerees to receive compensation 
will enable the state to set up a predictable cost structure. Refusing to 
compensate exonerees as a cost-containing measure may backfire since 
sympathetic juries are likely to give large damage awards to the wrongfully 
convicted. For instance, the City of Chicago paid $1.5 million to a man wrongly 
convicted of murder after a city crime lab analyst was found to have falsified 
reports.249 In another Chicago case, the city agreed to pay $9 million to settle a 
wrongful rape conviction lawsuit.250 Similarly, New York City paid $5 million 
when it came to light that the prosecution had suppressed exculpatory evidence 
in a rape case.251 
247. See Garrett, supra note II, at 53-56,71-99. 
248. For exonerees, the process should be more like SUbmitting an application than filing a 
lawsuit. Making the process an administrative rather than adversarial proceeding will reduce the 
toll on exonerees and the costs to government. 
249. See Steve Mills et ai., When Labs Falter, Defendants Pay, CHI. TRm., Oct. 20, 2004, 
available at http://truthinjustice.orgllabs-faiter.htm. 
250. Maurice Possley & Gary Washburn, City Will Pay $9 Million in False Jailing, CHI. TRm., 
Jan. 28, 2006, at I, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.coml2006-01-28/news/0601280288_ 
1_ dna-testing-chicago-police-supt-false-confessions. 
251. Andrea Elliott, City Gives $5 Million to Man Wrongly imprisoned in Child's Rape, N.Y. 
TiMEs, Dec. 16,2003, at B3, available at http://nytimes.coml2003112/16/nyregionlcity-gives-5-
million-to-man-wrongfully-imprisoned-in-child-s-rape.html. 
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If, instead of reacting to lawsuits, states develop plans for paying 
compensation under wrongful-conviction compensation statutes, they can 
encourage procedural changes that will lead to fewer instances of wrongful arrest 
and conviction. At the same time, they can prepare for the predictable costs of 
the scheme. 
N. FUNDING COMPENSATION STATUTES 
A state may refuse to pass a compensation statute for the wrongfully 
convicted. The state does not, however, escape paying for the harm it has 
tolerated, if not actually caused. As difficult as it is for exonerees to sue on 
wrongful imprisonment grounds, exonerees do win lawsuits, and when they do, 
their damage awards are often significant.252 Some entity of government pays 
when an exoneree wins a judgment against a prosecutor or a municipality. States 
should therefore accept their responsibility for wrongful convictions and 
implement fair and fairly administered compensation schemes. Recognizing that 
exonerations will occur means that the state can prepare for the inevitable 
payment of compensation instead of trying to find ways to deny recovery to 
wrongfully imprisoned persons. 
Rosenthal points out that many proposals calling for governments to pay tort 
damages require the government 
to assume costs in order to avoid losses experienced by others; 
consequently, they all have a negative impact on government budgets, 
regardless of the externalized benefits they may produce-unless one 
can make the rather implausible claim that these proposals would be so 
popular that the voters would tolerate an increase in taxes to fund the 
new expenditures that they necessitate. Yet one cannot find in any of the 
proposals for new governmental liability any consideration of the 
consequences that new liabilities will have on government budgeting, or 
on those who depend on government budgets for the variety of social 
goods allocated through that process.253 
By consequences, Rosenthal means that increased government spending in one 
area will result in less money for government spending in other areas. It is not 
enough for states to pass compensation statutes; they must also determine how 
these statutes will be funded. 
Current wrongful-conviction compensation statutes do not pay much 
attention to the sources of funding. In California, for example, exonerees are not 
discussed explicitly in budget information on the state's website.254 California 
252. See Robert T. Garrett, Texas House Votes to Boost Compensation for Wrongly 
Imprisoned, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Apr. 25, 2009, available at http://www.dallasnews.coml 
sharedcontentldws/dn/dnacases/storieslDN -innocent_ 25tex.AR T. State. Edition l.4a9c 71 a.html. 
253. Rosenthal, supra note 169, at 845. 
254. See generally Letter from Dep't of Finance to Dep't of Budget Officers, Dep't 
Accounting Officers, & Dep't of Finance Budget Staff (Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
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funds its wrongful-conviction compensation statute from the state's general 
fund255 pursuant to the California Penal Code.256 A specific source within the 
general fund is not designated. The state's department of corrections receives its 
funding from the general fund.257 Perhaps funding comes from the corrections 
budget, perhaps not. The general fund is a fairly haphazard source, as the 
provision of funds for DNA testing illustrates. In 2001, 
California mandated that all costs associated with representing inmates 
pursuant to Penal Code section 1405 to investigate and, if appropriate, 
file motions for DNA testing of biological evidence where such testing 
could prove innocence, be borne by the State. In that same year, 
California allocated $1.6 million dollars over two years to provide 
counsel to assist inmates with innocence claims. For 2002 and 2003, the 
NCIP [Northern California Innocence Project] and CIP [California 
Innocence Project] received state funding. That funding was 
discontinued as a result of state budget cuts in 2003.258 
Other states have equally vague sources of funding. Alabama pays awards 
out of any available state funds. 259 New Hampshire pays claims from any money 
in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.260 North Carolina provides awards 
from its contingency and emergency fund or other available state funds. 261 These 
states' statutes at least mention some funding source. Most, however, are silent. 
The most completely thought out statute seems to be Maryland's, which specifies 
that the board of public works should make payments to exonerees using money 
in the general emergency fund or money provided by the governor in the annual 
budget.262 If governments must "assume costs" in an attempt to avoid losses that 
others experience at their hands, they need to pass compensation statutes whose 
funding sources will be secure. 
Assuming a state is revisiting its statute or creating a new one, how can it 
fund the statute? One way to pay for harm is through insurance. In an insurance 
scheme, the insured protects against a risk by paying premiums to an insurer to 
http://www.dofca.gov/ budgeting/budget_letters/documentsfBLI0-26.pdf. 
255. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-06 (20lO). 
256. Id. § 2713.1. 
257. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CALIFORNIA: DISTRIBUTION OF STATE GENERAL FUND 
EXPENDITURES (IN MILLIONS), SFY2008, http://www.statehealthfacts.orglprofileind.jsp?rgn 
=6&ind=33&cat=1 (last visited Feb. 16,2011). In fiscal year 2008, the department of corrections 
received 9.4% of the general fund. Id. 
258. CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REpORT 107 (Feb. 22, 2008), 
available at http://www.ccfaj.orgidocuments/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf( emphases added). 
259. ALA. CODE § 29-2-160(a) (2003). 
260. N.H. REv. STAT. § 541-B:13 (2007). 
261. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84 (LEXlS through 20lO Reg. Sess.). 
262. MD. CODE ANN. STATE FIN. &PROC. § 10-501 (a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 20lO Reg. 
Sess.). 
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cover that risk.263 Employers provide insurance "to account for the risk of 
liability that employees face.,,264 Governments offer insurance to public 
employees through statutes, policies, or collective bargaining agreements.265 
Consumers buy insurance to extend product warranties. They buy trip insurance 
to minimize losses from having to cancel a trip. Self-employed workers buy 
medical insurance. Fathers and mothers buy life insurance to safeguard their 
children if the parents die.266 In all of these contexts, the purchaser of the 
insurance buys the insurance because he understands that a danger of harm exists 
generally and that the harm may befall him specifically.267 Yet even with 
sensational news stories about people being set free after years and years of 
wrongful imprisonment, there is no wrongful conviction insurance. Discussing 
ways in which requiring compensation for the wrongly convicted should lead to 
improvement in the criminal justice system, Evan Mandery says that 
[i]nsurance theory suggests that in the open market consumers would not 
choose to purchase "constitutional tort insurance." Generally speaking, 
people choose to buy insurance against losses that reduce wealth, but do 
not insure against intangible harms, such as emotional distress or 
affronts to ... [ dignity], that have no direct or indirect effect on wealth. 
Since most constitutional torts cause intangible damages, insurance 
theory argues that requiring citizens to purchase insurance against these 
kinds of injuries reduces their net welfare.268 
Arguably, wrongful incarceration is a constitutional tort that reduces net wealth 
and inflicts an array of intangible damages. But the point is that people will most 
likely not voluntarily spend money, and thereby reduce their net worth, to insure 
themselves against an event that seems so remote from the average person's 
experience. 
Assuming individuals will not buy wrongful conviction insurance, but 
realizing that individuals are harmed by wrongful conviction (generally through 
no fault of their own), should states impose higher taxes on citizens to spread out 
the risk? In the case of strict products liability, 
consumers pay premiums to manufacturers-through higher product 
prices-in exchange for indemnification against injuries caused by the 
products. The thought is that manufacturers are better able to bear the 
costs of injuries than individual consumers .... [T]he premium ... must 
be one that they [consumers] would choose to pay in a private market.269 
263. See Rosenthal, supra note 169, at 820-21. 
264. Id. at 820. 
265. Id. at 819. 
266. Mandery, supra note 192, at 5. 
267. I do not include automobile insurance in this discussion because its utility to the public 
is readily apparent, unlike insurance for something like wrongful convictions. 
268. Mandery, supra note 192, at 7. 
269. Id. 
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The analogy is between consumers paying premiums to manufacturers through 
higher prices and citizens paying premiums to the government through higher 
taxes. Governments are unlikely to see raising taxes as a solution because raising 
taxes imposes a political cost on elected government officials. Voters may not 
re-elect officials who raise taxes. A government will therefore avoid raising 
taxes if those taxes are to insure against a constitutional harm that is typically not 
the kind of harm people will insure against with their own money. 
If states are not willing to pay for compensation statutes through direct 
taxation, is there some other way for states to assume this burden? A more useful 
analogy is to see states as manufacturers insuring themselves against injuries 
caused by their product, the criminal justice system. Manufacturers are thought 
to be better able to "to bear the costs of injuries than individual consumers.'>270 
But manufacturers can bear these costs because they get them back from 
consumers in the form of higher prices. Since the states do not want to raise 
taxes to pay for wrongful convictions, they need an insurance company of their 
own. So the analogy shifts again: now each individual state is a consumer, and 
the group of all the states becomes the insurer. Banding together, the states could 
create a wrongful convictions funding pool much larger than any single state's 
fund for damage awards. All the states would contribute,271 but only a few states 
would likely need to use the funds in any particular year. In this manner, the 
funds will be able to grow. 
A state could also create its own fund to cover the costs of compensating 
exonerees. Ideally, the fund would grow large enough that compensation could 
be paid from the interest it generates, and not from the principal. An argument 
can be made that there is no need to create a dedicated fund to cover the costs of 
exoneree compensation because specific awards "are a small percentage of any 
state's annual budget.,,272 Lookingjust at numbers, this seems to be a valid point. 
For example, California's total budget expenditure for 2008 was about one 
hundred billion dollars.273 An award of one or two million is nothing in the face 
of that number. Would this amount be more significant if it is targeted to come 
out of the corrections budget instead of the general fund? Even a small award 
makes up a larger percent of the corrections budget than the overall state budget. 
California's corrections budget for 2008 was 9.4% of the state's total budget.274 
This figure is certainly a small percentage of the whole state budget; however, 
it still amounted to about $9.6 billion. When corrections spends over $9 billion 
270. ld. 
271. States could contribute based on the size of their felony prison populations, for example. 
272. Karin D. Martin, A Model State Policy for the Treatment of the Wrongfully Convicted, 
LIFE AfTER EXONERA nON PROGRAM 31 (2006), http://www.exonerated.org/contentiimagesiarticIesi 
model%20state%20policy"1020-%20karin%20martin.pdf. Martin conducted this study as part of 
the requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree of the Goldman School of Public Policy, 
Univ. of Cal., Berkeley. Jd. at l. 
273. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 257. 
274. ld. 
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a year, an award of $1 million or $2 million should be affordable. But this 
argument-that there is no need to create a dedicated fund because specific 
awards are relatively small-must be a spurious argument because some states 
do not provide compensation at all, and those that do have compensation statutes 
do not spontaneously make awards. Instead, they force the exoneree to sue the 
state to set the compensation machinery in motion. Therefore, the insignificance 
of the amount does not guarantee payment. 
Assuming that a state decides to create a fund to pay for compensation 
claims, the question is how the state will make payments into the fund. Three 
sources can be tapped. The first source of funds is prosecutors' budgets. 
Whenever an exoneree is awarded compensation for wrongful incarceration, the 
attorney general's office should be required to contribute to the fund.275 Even if 
the process for establishing factual innocence reveals that the state was without 
fault, the attorney general's office must still make the payment to the fund.276 
Also, in those few states that have implemented administrative procedures 
instead of adversarial ones,277 the attorney general's office should still be 
required to pay into the fund. 
The second source of funds is the corrections budget. The fund could be set 
up to require a yearly payment from the corrections budget, which could be a set 
amount or a fluctuating percentage. In either case, it can be calculated in various 
ways. The amount could be based on the size of the prison population. 
Alternatively, it could be based on the number offelons in prison or the average 
number of exonerations per year over a set period. In California, for example, 
twenty-seven claims for exoneration were approved between 1989 and 2003.278 
Taking the ratio to be twenty-seven exonerations per fifteen years, the average 
275. This proposal may raise the ire of prosecutors. See Medwed, supra note 9, at 157. 
276. An example is "if the erroneous conviction were entirely the fault of a perjurious 
witness." Saks et aI., supra note 219, at 682 n.35. Incidentally, the state may bring criminal 
charges against the perjurious witness. Id. 
277. Alabama's remedy is exclusively administrative. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-151 to -165 
(2003). California has an administrative scheme. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (2010). North 
Carolina and Wisconsin also have administrative schemes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-83 (LEXIS 
through 2010 Leg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Leg.). In 
Texas, an exoneree applies for administrative remedies. See TEX. ClY. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 103.051 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Leg.). In New Hampshire, for a claim forless than 
$5000, the claimant follows administrative procedures. For a claim between $5000 and $50,000, 
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the administrative and judicial fora. Above $50,000, the 
claimant must follow the judicial route and sue in superior court. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:9 
(2007). In New Hampshire, then, most wrongful compensation claims would be brought as suits 
against the state in superior court. In Tennessee, the board of claims investigates and hears 
administrative claims for compensation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (West, Westlaw 
through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
278. CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 258. In addition, twenty-five 
claims were denied and nineteen were dismissed as untimely, incomplete, or because the claimant 
was still in prison. Id. 
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yearly number of exonerations would be 1.8, or about two exonerations per year. 
The third source of revenue comes from re-visioning how the department of 
corrections spends money to maintain inmates. The state's correctional authority 
must be seen as establishing a "line" in the budget for each prisoner. This line 
should not end with a prisoner's exoneration. Each year, the money that would 
have been spent on the (now-exonerated) prisoner would go into the exoneree's 
compensation fund. The exonerated prisoner would receive the set statutory 
amount annually until he has received payment for each of the years that he 
served in prison. If an exoneree dies before receiving his full payout, the 
remainder of the statutory amount would go to his heirs annually until the 
exoneree's years of prison service are compensated. Even after the exoneree or 
his estate has received the full payout to which he is entitled, however, the 
exoneree's budget line need not evaporate. In order to build up the fund, 
corrections could continue to make payments from the exoneree's prison budget 
line until the exoneree actually dies or until he was projected to die, whichever 
is longer. For a life sentence, payment should continue for the projected actuarial 
life span of the exonerated person. 
All three of the proposed revenue sources for a state's own compensation 
fund are based on the two theories underlying tort liability: (1) the corrective 
justice theory that the state has a moral obligation to make victims whole279 and 
(2) the instrumental theory that the threat ofliability creates incentives to avoid 
behavior that triggers liability.280 In corrective justice terms, it is appropriate to 
impose some of the moral obligation to make victims whole on prosecutors' 
offices since those offices bear some responsibility for the harm. Making the 
office strictly liable under the instrumental theory obviates the necessity to find 
any particular culprit, which is useful if specific prosecutors are no longer in 
office.281 Even though the prosecutor who allowed a wrongful conviction to 
occur may have left the department, every prosecutor taking office after passage 
of this statute will know that a portion of the funding for exoneree awards comes 
from the prosecutor's budget. 
As noted earlier in this Article, prosecutors will resist this requirement.282 
Describing existing statutes, Medwed writes that "[ a ]lthough these statutes do not 
expressly designate that funds used for this compensation should be drawn 
directly from prosecutors' budgets, the impact of these payouts on state coffers 
could conceivably have an indirect effect on the amount of money allocated to 
prosecutors partially dependent on state funding.,,283 I suggest that the funding 
under revised statutes should have a direct effect on money allocated to 
279. See supra Part III.B.2. 
280. See supra Part III.B.I. 
281. Cf Medwed, supra note 9, at 144 (assigning post-conviction motions based on whether 
lawyer who prosecuted case was still in office). 
282. See supra note 275. I realize that this proposal implicates the very reason that prosecutors 
may resist post-conviction claims of innocence. However, all participants in wrongful convictions 
should participate in the remedy. 
283. Medwed, supra note 9, at 157 (internal footnotes omitted). 
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prosecutors. Knowing that their budgets will be affected every time a wrongfully 
convicted person is exonerated should create a stronger incentive for prosecutors 
to avoid the practices that give rise to wrongful convictions.284 
The second source of revenue-the automatic yearly payment from the 
corrections budget to the compensation fund-works similarly. It is not possible 
at the level of a huge department to blame specific individuals for the 
miscarriages of justice that result in wrongful convictions. But holding that 
department strictly liable for a significant portion of compensation funding is 
appropriate because that is the only department that could have condoned bad 
practices and can now stop them. 
The third source of revenue-requiring corrections to continue carrying the 
expense of maintaining a prisoner by paying into the fund what it would have 
spent if the prisoner had not been exonerated-similarly satisfies both theories 
oftort liability. Continuing to "pay" for a prisoner who has left the system helps 
provide a viable fund that could make future victims whole. Requiring 
corrections to make these payments puts pressure on the department of 
government that is both most likely and most able to make changes, leading to 
fewer wrongful convictions. 
There is a difference between the first two revenue streams and the 
department of corrections' budget "line." The first two revenue streams will 
yield reasonably predictable amounts because the amounts are based on averages. 
The method of calculation (and re-calculation, from time to time) of these 
averages must be established in the statute. By contrast, the third source, which 
is the amount the state pays to the fund under the budget line concept, is more 
fluid. That amount depends on several variables. One variable is how many 
exonerated individuals are receiving compensation at anyone time. The more 
exonerees receiving compensation, the higher the amount coming from budget 
lines will be. The second variable is whether an exoneree was on death row 
when he was exonerated and released. The cost to the state to maintain a person 
on death row is higher than the cost to maintain a prisoner serving a life 
sentence.285 When a death row inmate is exonerated, therefore, the state would 
put into the fund the difference between what it costs to maintain a death row 
inmate and an inmate serving a life sentence without the possibility ofparole.286 
284. The creation of incentives to avoid bad practices is a third pragmatic reason in favor of 
wrongful-conviction compensation statutes. See supra Part III.D. 
285. A New Jersey commission studying the death penalty found that the state would save $1.3 
million per year in costs of incarceration ifit switched just one death row inmate's sentence to a 
sentence oflife without parole. Joe Bargmann, Debating the Cost o/Capital Punishment, PARADE, 
Jan. 31, 2010, at 6, available at http://parade.comlnews/intelligence-report/archive/100131-
debating-the-cost-of-capital-punishment.html. Natasha Minsker, death penalty policy director of 
Northern California's ACLU affiliate, has said that changing death sentences to pennanent 
imprisonment would save California $1 billion over five years. Scott Smith, State Moves Closer 
to Resuming Executions, STOCKTON REe., Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://www.recordnet.coml 
apps/pbcs.dll/article? AlD=/20 1 00 1 06/ A _ NEWS/ I 060309. 
286. In a generous statute, the compensation for an exonerated death row inmate would be 
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But even allowing for a higher level of compensation because of the traumatic 
experience of facing execution, the annual cost of compensation for an 
exonerated death row inmate could be lower than the annual cost to maintain that 
person on death row. 
Unpredictable results may also arise in the case of older prisoners. Thus, the 
age of the prisoner is the third variable. The cost to the state of paying into the 
fund for elderly exonerees is probably going to be less than the cost of 
maintaining them as older prisoners. Although it is true that "like other segments 
of the population, inmates are living longer,,,287 many criminology researchers 
consider offenders to be "elderly" at fifty-five.288 According to Snyder, this is 
because of "the shorter life expectancy and lower health status of criminal 
offenders. "289 If inmates are elderly at fifty-five, with impaired health and 
shortened life expectancy, they can be expected to develop the illnesses of age 
sooner than those who are not inmates. Older prisoners need more medical care; 
as a result, they cost more to maintain.290 If a prisoner is exonerated before 
developing the illnesses of age, it is possible that the budget line payment that the 
state continues to make into the fund every year on his behalf will be less than 
the actual cost to maintain the prisoner. 
CONCLUSION 
Wrongful convictions cost states money, resources, public goodwill, and 
moral authority. Well-planned wrongful-conviction compensation statutes help 
to mitigate all of these costs. But whether states contribute to a multi-state pool 
or create their own dedicated funds, state costs will certainly remain. Initially, 
states will need to spend money to get their funds operational. And states will 
have to commit continuing resources to maintaining the funds. Nevertheless, 
passing wrongful-conviction compensation statutes that include identified 
funding sources has important advantages over the haphazard systems generally 
in place now. The human cost to exonerees will be less; the financial cost to the 
states will be more predictable and more manageable. 
Of course, it is better for exonerees not to have to fight yet again to receive 
compensation. It is better for states, too. Their criminal processes will improve. 
Their reputations will not be savaged in the press when juries make huge awards 
to exonerees. Presumably, it will be easier for states to fulfill their moral 
obligations to their citizens. And a citizenry often cynical about the justice 
system may begin to find renewed optimism that there actually is justice in the 
system. 
adjusted to reflect that the exoneree was on death row. 
287. Cindy Snyder et aI., Older Adult Inmates: The Challenge/or Social Work, 54 Soc. 
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